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ABSTRACT 
It is inevitable that the PRC will continue to extend its influence over South 
Korea.  Korea recognizes that China as a land-based identity has historically tried to form 
its sphere of influence and intervened in the Korean affairs.  Despite the anti-
Americanism in Korea, Seoul understands that there is a strong need for the U.S.-ROK 
alliance not only to deter the DPRK but also to ensure that the maritime power can 
counterbalance against Chinese intrusion in the Korean affairs.  History shows that Korea 
has preferred to rely on an external power to counterbalance against a proximate power, 
and it would be a tough situation for the ROK to withstand the weight of the PRC alone.  
Seoul’s security interest will dominate the cultural and economic aspects of relations with 
China.  Therefore, Seoul has a vested interest in ensuring the pre-eminence of the United 
States.  Seoul must send an unambiguous signal to Washington that it continues to desire 
the U.S.-ROK alliance while maintaining its economic relationship with Beijing.  Beijing 
must recognize that the presence of U.S. forces is a historical and geopolitical necessity 
for South Korea. 
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The economic, diplomatic, and cultural ties between the Republic of Korea 
(ROK) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) are growing.  Whether the two Koreas 
unify or not, this trend is likely to continue.  At the same time, the U.S.-ROK alliance is 
facing a challenge.  This thesis addresses the following questions. 
• How has South Korea managed its relationship with China and the United 
States?   
• What is the future of the U.S.-ROK alliance? 
This thesis argues that China has historically tried to influence Korea and the 
U.S.-ROK alliance is necessary for the ROK to counterbalance against the encroaching 
Chinese influence. Although there have been many tensions and points of friction in the 
U.S.-ROK relationship, the ROK derives many benefits from the U.S.-ROK alliance. 
B. IMPORTANCE 
Washington and Beijing share a “mutual strategic suspicion”; they worry about 
each other’s intentions and interests.1  The PRC has modernized the People’s Liberation 
Army (PLA), and the United States has “felt compelled” to enhance the capabilities of 
itself and the Republic of Taiwan (ROC).2  Beijing worries that South Korea might be 




                                                 
1 The US-ROK Strategic Forum, “The Search for a Common Strategic Vision: Charting the Future of 
the US-ROK Security Partnership,” The Nautilus Institute.  
2 Alan D. Romberg, “U.S. Strategic Interests in NorthEast Asia: 2009 and Beyond,” The Henry L. 
Stimson Center.  
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military presence in the reunified Korea.3  In pursuit of its geopolitical interests, Beijing 
regards the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) as a buffer state against the 
United States.4   
With its rising economic power and proximate location, China will undoubtedly 
further increase its influence in the Korean Peninsula.  In the past, Korea suffered 
frequently when Japan or China was rising in power.  The significance of the Korean 
Peninsula to China has not changed.  The geographical location of the Korean Peninsula 
has been a concern to the major powers as shown in the Japanese invasion on Chosun in 
the 16th century, the Qing’s invasion in the 17th century, the Sino-Japanese War, the 
Russo-Japanese War, and the Korean War.  As a smaller state in a power-concentrated 
region, Korea has to decide its foreign policy cautiously with respect to China, Japan, 
Russia, North Korea, and the United States.   
The growing relationship between the ROK and the PRC has to be re-evaluated 
and reflected in the U.S. policy.  The United States must decide on its policy approach to 
the U.S.-ROK alliance for the twenty-first Century.  The ROK has been a U.S. ally since 
1953.  The United States has transferred its military technology and doctrines to the 
ROK.  The ROK provides a place for the forward deployed American troops and 
strategic flexibility in the region.  It provides a strategic location vis-à-vis China and 
Russia.  If Washington is to counterbalance China or Russia while guarding against the 
DPRK, it will be crucial to maintain strong alliance with the ROK and Japan.  A decline 
in the U.S.-ROK alliance would signal a rising Chinese influence and waning American 
influence.   
There may be incentives for China to pull the ROK away from the United States.  
The ROK may benefit from maintaining an alliance with a distant overseas power against 
a proximate power.  The ROK may even consider pursuing diplomacy separately from 
business.  While this may have served Roh Moo-hyun’s “balancer” policy, the ROK must  
 
                                                 
3 Selig Harrison, "Time to leave Korea?"  Foreign Affairs  80,  no. 2  (March  1,  2001): 65. 
4 The US-ROK Strategic Forum, “Common Strategic Vision.”  
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recognize that China was an imperial power and that China is an economic competitor for 
exports and resources.  It remains to be seen if Seoul can pursue its policy independent of 
Beijing’s influence.   
If the ROK switches sides and bandwagons with the PRC, there may be profits 
lost in the absence of a close relationship between Seoul and Washington.  Yet if Seoul is 
to balance against the PRC, Seoul is likely to incur heavy costs: its diplomatic and 
economic relationship with China would deteriorate, and Beijing would ensure the 
survival of the DPRK to balance against the U.S.-ROK alliance, perceived as a threat to 
the PRC’s influence in the region.   
China and Korea share a long period of history, though there was a gap in their 
relationship from the late nineteenth century up to the Sino-ROK normalization in 1992.  
Starting in the late nineteenth century, Korea has gone through radical changes, and when 
one’s identity is in flux, people look to history for an insight.  The future behavior of 
Korea will be decided by how the Koreans view their past in comparison with practical 
and realistic expectations of the future.  The Koreans will compare how China and the 
United States have dealt with Korea in the past.   
Northeastern Asia has not had an active war since 1953.  With more than five 
decades of tentative peace under the 1953 armistice, perhaps it is possible for peaceful 
behavior to be institutionalized beyond the truce agreement.  Regardless, the U.S. 
military presence in the ROK deters provocation in the region and provides stability.  The 
North Korean nuclear question and Korean reunification, however, remain unresolved.  If 
the United States is able to maintain the ROK-U.S. alliance with the reunified Korea, it 
may bring benefits to all concerned or increase tension with the PRC.  It is important to 
review the direction of the ROK-U.S. alliance while the PRC is on the rise.   
C. ORGANIZATION 
This thesis follows the historical evolution of the relationship between Korea and 
China in Chapter II.  It tries to develop and utilize the idea of China as a land-based 
territory.  It describes the burdensome Qing-Chosun tributary system, the detrimental 
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consequence of the Kuomintang’s (ROC) refusal to recognize the Korean Provisional 
Government (KPG), the hostile relations between the PRC and the ROK since 1948, the 
Sino-ROK rapprochement since the 1970s, and the growing relations between the PRC 
and the ROK in recent times.  Although the cultural and economic ties between the PRC 
and the ROK have grown closer, the cultures of the ROK and the PRC are fundamentally 
different, and the complementary economic relationship may turn into a competitive 
system.  Realism dominates the cultural and economic aspects.   
Chapter III deals with a shorter period of the U.S.-ROK relationship and how the 
Koreans have felt about the U.S. policy in the ROK.  It is self-evident that the ROK has 
derived much benefit from the United States.  Chapter III also focuses on challenges to 
and implications for the U.S.-ROK alliance, examining especially in depth the sentiment 
of anti-Americanism, which remains a particular concern for the U.S.-ROK alliance and 
underscores much historical narrative since the 1980s.   The degree of the anti-
Americanism has fluctuated widely since the 1980s, and yet the U.S.-ROK alliance has 
endured.  As long as the United States and the ROK share compatible political goals, 
namely the ROK’s desire to distance itself from the PRC’s sphere of dominance and the 
United States’ desire to counterbalance the PRC, the U.S.-ROK alliance is a geopolitical 
necessity.  The DPRK remains as the foremost problem in East Asia.  It is crucial for the 
current Lee Myung-bak administration to steer the ROK closer to the United States than 
to the PRC.  It is crucial for Washington to maintain a closer relationship with Tokyo and 
Seoul against encroaching China.  Washington and Seoul must focus on commonality 
and accommodate each other’s interests as much as possible.  Seoul must send a clear 
signal to Washington that it will remain closer to Washington.          
This thesis proceeds on the premise that the ROK is the rightful successor to 
Chosun and the KPG, and it assumes that, in case of a reunification, the ROK will absorb 
the DPRK despite the PRC’s objections.  This thesis is interested in the viewpoint of the 
Korean people with regards to the major powers and what direction Seoul will choose. 
Although this thesis recognizes the importance of culture and trade between nations as 
important factors in international relations, it recognizes that realism and geopolitical 
necessity trump cultural and economic factors.   
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II.  A HISTORY OF THE SINO-KOREAN RELATIONSHIP 
Korean sovereignty declined with respect to independence from China-based 
empires through the successive regimes of Silla, Goryeo, and Chosun.  Finally, Imperial 
Japan annexed Chosun in 1910.  For the first half of the twentieth century, the Koreans 
fought for independence and sovereignty from the rule of Imperial Japan.  Since the 
Korean War, the South Koreans have struggled against communism and sought economic 
prosperity and full democracy.  Because of the colonial period and the Cold War, South 
Korea and China were separated and resided in different spheres of influence.  Japan 
severed the Qing-Chosun tie.  The Cold War and U.S. influence helped to maintain the 
separation of China and South Korea, and the ROK has been able to pursue its foreign 
policy independently, for the most part, from China’s interests.  The ROK currently finds 
itself at a crossroad yet again, however, regarding how to adjust to the changing 
geopolitics of a resurgent China and the souring U.S.-ROK alliance.   
Although the history, culture, and literature of China have been taught and 
enjoyed by South Koreans, the idea of a tributary system and the Chinese influence do 
not appeal to a new generation, who grew up in democracy and the syncretism of the 
Western and Korean cultures.   
A. THE QING AND CHOSUN 
Stephen Walt argues that “small and weak states in close proximity to a great 
power are the most likely candidates for bandwagoning.”5  He also argues that “states 
form alliances to balance against threats rather than bandwagon with them,”6 and that 
balancing is more prevalent because states desire the preservation of sovereignty rather 
than “subordination under a potential hegemon.”7  Walt’s theory, however, is not 
applicable to Choson because Choson did not voluntarily bandwagon with Qing, but was 
                                                 
5 Stephen M. Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” International Security 9, 
no. 4  (Spring 1985): 18.. 
6 Ibid., 33. 
7 Ibid., 15. 
 6
forced to be a tributary state.  Furthermore, Choson did not make an alliance with Japan 
to counterbalance against Qing.  Korea, in fact, has never formed an alliance with Japan 
against China.    
In contrast, Randall Schweller argues that bandwagoning is “far more widespread 
than Walt suggests,” and that “the most important determinant of alignment is the 
compatibility of political goals, not imbalances of power or threat.”8  This certainly 
seems applicable to the Sino-ROK rapprochement in the 1980s because of the 
“convergence of interests” between Beijing and Seoul.9 
Nevertheless, under the Qing-Chosun tributary system, it can hardly be argued 
that there existed compatible political goals as equal powers.  Before the technological 
innovations in communication and transport, it was infeasible for Qing’s tributary states 
in the periphery such as Vietnam, Okinawa, and Korea to form an alliance against Qing.  
Since Chosun rejected an alliance with Japan, it had to withstand Qing’s influence alone.         
Whereas Walt sees threat as the factor that determines alliance behavior, 
Schweller sees self-preservation as a cause for balancing and “self-extension or gain” as a 
cause for bandwagoning.10  In this sense, Schweller’s prediction does not apply to Korea 
since Korea historically did not bandwagon with Qing China for “self-extension or gain.”  
Rather, the tributary system was imposed on the Korean Peninsula by force.  Even before 
the Manchus invaded Ming China, Nurhaci subjugated King Injo of Chosun.       
Jonathan Spence argues that the Qing emphasized and utilized its cultural 




                                                 
8 Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit," International Security  19, no. 1 (July 1, 1994): 75. 
9 Jae Ho Chung, Between Ally and Partner: Korea-China Relations and the United States (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2007), 22. 
10 Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit,” 74. 
11 Jonathan Spence, The Search for Modern China (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1990), 118, 
119. 
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relationship was based on the Confucian idea that like a person, every state had a proper 
station in the international order.12  Chosun was the “model tributary nation” of “the 
perfected Chinese pattern.”13   
“Chinese culture did in fact exert an influence upon the psychology of the people 
of Korea.”14  The Qing “did not exercise intentionally any purely cultural influence on 
Korea” because Chosun was already “fully sinicized.”15  Nevertheless, Confucianism 
proved to be detrimental to Korea because it prevented the adoption of the Western 
concept of sovereignty based on equal status; and Chosun lost its sovereignty because it 
did not let the foreign powers counterbalance each other.16   
The relationship between China and Korea was not as harmonious as it seemed.  
Most of the 930 foreign invasions in the Korean Peninsula came from China; 
nevertheless, Koreans today have “positive – even unconditionally favorable” views 
regarding China, and it appears that the Koreans have forgotten the PRC’s military 
intervention in the Korean War.17   
Sinocentric studies describe the Qing-Chosun tributary system as “harmonious” 
and overlook the “conflict and tension”; Chosun hid its “hostility” toward Qing.18  
Nevertheless, contemporary South Koreans are likely to recall the Qing-Chosun 
relationship with resentment and may openly criticize China if the PRC’s policy is seen 
as imperial toward South Korea.   
 
                                                 
12 Immanuel Hsu, The Rise of Modern China (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 130.  
13 Diana Lary, ed., The Chinese State at the Borders (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007), 129. 
14 Hae-jong Chun, “Sino-Korean Tributary Relations in the Ch’ing Period,” in Readings in Modern 
Chinese History, ed. Immanuel Hsu, 90-112  (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), 105. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Stephen D. Krasner, "Organized Hypocrisy in Nineteenth-Century East Asia," International 
Relations of the Asia Pacific  1, no. 2 (August 1, 2001): 190.  
17 Chung, Between Ally and Partner, 13. 
18 Lary, ed., Chinese State at the Borders, 131. 
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The Qing-Chosun tribute system was not beneficial to the Chosun’s economy.  
Chosun sustained a net loss from the tributary system because Qing imposed a heavy 
burden on the tribute and restricted trade flow.19  Trades were limited to three border 
locations and were held semi-annually, annually, and biannually, and Chosun sustained 
an estimated net loss of 500,000 taels of silver in total legal and illegal trades.20  Chosun 
sent its tribute missions four times a year along with a considerable amount of “gifts” to 
the Qing’s officials and spent an average of one-sixth of Chosun’s annual budget to 
maintain the Qing embassies.21  
Culture and trade were not the major factors that caused and maintained the Qing-
Chosun tributary system.  In 1619, Chosun sent 20,000 troops to aid the Ming and fight 
against the rising Qing.  While the Qing was rising in power, Chosun supported Ming.  
Subsequently, the Qing invaded Chosun twice before it launched an offensive into Ming.  
It was the military might of the Qing that subjugated Chosun as a tributary state.  In the 
second Qing invasion in 1627, Nurhaci forced King Injo to prostrate in obeisance and 
took the Chosun crown prince as a political hostage to ensure Chosun’s compliance and 
submission to Qing.22  The Qing-Chosun tributary system started with a major 
humiliation for Chosun and further retarded the recovery of the Chosun’s national 
strength after the invasion by Toyotomi Hideyoshi in the 1590s.   
Andre Schmid asserts that the Qing-Chosun tributary system was far from 
“harmonious,” and in fact, “hostilities” existed throughout.23  Chosun felt enmity at the 
rise of the Manchus; Chosun documents reveal frequent “anti-Manchu pejoratives,” and 
the Chosun elite rejected the Manchus as the “successor of the Chinese tradition.”24  
Sino-centric studies overlook the Chosun records and reflect only Qing official records, 
                                                 
19 Chun, “Sino-Korean Tributary Relations,” 104-105.  
20 Chun, “Sino-Korean Tributary Relations,” 103. 
21 Hsu, Rise of Modern China, 102, 132. 
22 Lary, ed., Chinese State at the Borders, 130. 
23 Ibid., 128. 
24 Ibid., 127-128. 
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which suggested a “semblance of an ideal tributary system.”25  When a smaller nation has 
to exist under an imperial state, an institutionalized behavior of non-cooperation and 
subterfuge may be an effective, if not the only tool to employ.  It would be interesting to 
see whether this historical precedent has carried over into the negotiating behavior in the 
Korean Peninsula.    
The Chosun government attempted to minimize the intrusion of Qing.  When the 
Kangxi Emperor sent his envoy to survey the border between Qing and Chosun, Chosun 
manifested “obstreperous non-cooperation” and a “subdued defiance”; even the Chosun 
king even subverted the survey efforts, but despite knowledge of being deceived, the 
Qing envoy only blamed heavy weather and river along the border, while the Chosun 
border agents reported their success at foiling the survey efforts.26     
The Confucian way of assigning proper station in the international order was 
imposed on Chosun because of Qing’s superior military power and underlying threat.  
Chosun simply could not compete against the Qing.  If Chosun were to declare its 
independence from the Qing tributary system, the Qing would have used its military, 
much like the situation of the PRC and the ROC.  Ideally, Chosun’s focus was on the 
preservation of its sovereignty and minimum interference from the Qing.   
The Qing would have been reluctant for other tributary nations to declare 
independence.  The Qing imposed exorbitant tribute and investiture rituals and ensured 
that Chosun remained economically and militarily weak.  What Chosun paid in tribute in 
comparison to Qing’s revenue did not amount to much, but it ensured a tight budget in 
the Chosun court and hampered military spending.  The tribute system maintained the 
stability and dominance of the Qing by weakening the border states.  This is in stark 
contrast with the U.S. policy in helping its allies to become strong.  South Koreans must 
see that the American system worked for their interest.  The traditional Chinese system 
worked against the Chosun’s interest of achieving a strong statehood.   
                                                 
25 Lary, ed., Chinese State at the Borders, 140. 
26 Ibid., 138, 141. 
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In the late nineteenth century, Li Hongzhang still considered Chosun as the 
Qing’s “fundamental territory” and “outer dominion and protective fence for 
Manchuria.”27  Nevertheless, as Qing realized its inability to defend Korea and itself 
against the West, it started to advise Chosun to open up to the West.  When Japan 
attacked Kanghwa Bay, the Qing attempted to disengage from Korea, stating that Chosun 
“always had complete freedom in its domestic and foreign affairs.”28  Subsequently, 
Chosun signed treaties with the United States, Britain, France, and Germany in the 1880s, 
and the Qing-Chosun tributary system was undermined.29  Even so, the Qing and Chosun 
wanted recognition of Chosun as a tributary state to Qing, but the United States and other 
Western powers rejected it.30   
At this crossroad, hedging behavior can be seen in a letter Chosun sent to 
Washington.  Chosun tried to maintain its traditional role as a tribute state and at the 
same time tried to establish an equal status with the United States. 
Cho-sen (Korea) has been a state tributary to China from ancient times.  
Yet hitherto full sovereignty has been exercised by the king of Cho-sen in 
all matters of internal administration and foreign relations.  Cho-sen and 
the United States, in establishing now by mutual consent a treaty, are 
dealing with each other upon a basis of equality. . . . As regards the 
various duties which devolve upon Cho-sen as a tributary state to China, 
with these the United States has no concern whatever.31 
Although the Qing tried to maintain its influence over Chosun, it was the military 
might of Japan that ended Qing’s tributary system over Chosun.  Also, it was the military 
might of the Qing that severed Chosun’s allegiance to Ming.  The Qing wanted to 
maintain its hegemony over Chosun and prevent Japan’s expansion into Korea, but Japan 
set up a Korean “regent” after the Sino-Japanese War of 1894.32  After the defeat of its 
                                                 
27 Immanuel Hsu ed., Readings in Modern Chinese History (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1971), 274. 
28 Hsu, Rise of Modern China, 334. 
29 Spence, Search for Modern China, 220. 
30 Krasner, "Nineteenth-Century East Asia," 190. 
31 Key-hiuk Kim, The Last Phase of the East Asian World Order: Korea, Japan, and the Chinese 
Empire, 1860-1882 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 315. 
32 Spence, Search for Modern China, 222. 
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northern navy, the Qing signed the Treaty of Shimonoseki, acknowledging “the full and 
complete independence and autonomy of Korea” and recognizing Chosun as a Japan’s 
protectorate.33  The tributary relationship between the Qing and Chosun came to an end.  
The Qing was not able to protect Chosun despite enfeeblement of Chosun with 
burdensome demands for tributes.  The Qing-Chosun tributary system failed Chosun 
when Chosun most needed the Qing’s protection against external threats. 
B. CHINA AND KOREA UNDER IMPERIAL JAPAN 
In the period from 1910 to 1945, Chinese and Koreans shared a common political 
objective of ousting Imperial Japan from the continent, but differed with regards to the 
“Korean question.”  The Korean Provisional Government (KPG) was not an organization 
that the ROC saw as fit to head the Qing’s former tribute nation.  The ROC did not 
recognize the KPG as the legitimate government of Korea, and this had a detrimental 
effect for the Korean Peninsula.   
Among the limited materials, more is written about the relationship between the 
KPG and the ROC than between the Korean communists and the CCP.  This section 
briefly deals with the interaction between the Korean communists and the CCP, and 
describes how the ROC dealt with the KPG and the “Korean question.”  Also, in doing 
so, it describes the formative years for the ROK and the DPRK.  Nationalism and Kim Il-
sung’s Juche ideology are the natural byproducts of this era.   
Chosun ceased to exist officially after the 1910 Annexation Treaty.  Japan used 
Korea as an industrial base and supply line for the conquest of China, and Korea became 
an “appendage of Japan’s home economy.”34  For Imperial Japan, Korea was at the 
strategic center for Manchuria.35  In this period, most books deal only with the Japanese 
colonialism and its impact on Korea.   
                                                 
33 Spence, Search for Modern China, 223. 
34 Nym Wales, “Rebel Korea,” Pacific Affairs, 15 (1942): 29-30. 
35 Daeyeol Ku, "Korean International Relations in the Colonial Period and the Question of 
Independence," Korea Journal 38, no. 4 (January 1, 1998): 112.  
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After the Korean Independence Movements of 1919, many Korean activists fled 
to Chinese treaty ports and Manchuria.36  By the 1930s, one million Korean immigrants 
lived in Manchuria, and 50,000 to 70,000 Korean partisans fought against Japan.37  By 
1945, two millions Koreans lived in Manchuria.38  The interaction between China and 
Korea came from Koreans in exile.   
In the late 1930s, the CCP at Yanan supported the North China Korean Volunteer 
Army (NCKVA) and the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army (NAJUA).39  In 
Manchuria, the Koreans comprised 90 percent of the CCP and 80 percent of the anti-
Japanese guerillas; in 1936, 80 percent of the two regiments under Kim Il-sung’s Third 
Division of the CCP were Koreans.40   
The ROC and Imperial Japan both opposed communism, and the Koreans who 
were suspected as communists, nationalists, or Japanese agents were “murdered from 
both sides.”41  By 1941, Imperial Japan eliminated 200,000 Korean communists and 
guerillas, the CCP expelled between 500 to 2,000 Koreans in 1933 to 1936; and Stalin 
killed “every” Korean communist within his reach.42  Kim Il-sung survived both purges 
by the Chinese and the Soviets.  The North Korean communists who survived the purge 
must have realized the need for a Korean nation that would not question the identity and 
loyalty of its citizens.  Xenophobic nationalism was an inevitable consequence.   
There is a similarity in how Qing and the ROC dealt with the Korean Peninsula.  
Although the ROC was not an imperial power, it sought influence over the Korean 
Peninsula and a new regional order after the Pacific War.  The strategic significance of 
Korea did not change.  The ROC did itself a disfavor in not recognizing the KPG, 
however, perhaps due to the KPG’s independent spirit that had sought a departure from 
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the previous Qing-Chosun relationship.  The ROC’s decision not to recognize the KPG 
had a significant impact on the Cairo Conference in 1943 and the Yalta Agreement in 
1944.  Much blame for the division of the Korean Peninsula traces back to the ROC in 
not recognizing the KPG and promoting the independence of Korea.     
China as a territory-based identity has a similar geopolitical concern over the 
Korean territory.  Although the imperial investiture by Qing ceased to exist, the potential 
legitimization and recognition of the KPG by the ROC carried an important consequence.  
And for a long time, the ROK and the DPRK refused to recognize each other as 
legitimate governments.  They both derived their legitimacy from external powers.  The 
question remains as to how a united Korea would obtain its legitimacy from the PRC.  It 
is unquestionable that Washington and Tokyo would promptly recognize a united Korea.  
Even Russia would promptly recognize a united Korea to balance against the PRC’s 
influence in the region. 
While the KPG existed for the independence of Korea and depended on the ROC 
for meager financial and military support, the ROC influenced the United States not to 
recognize the KPG and sought to reassert influence over Korea.43  As long as the ROC’s 
interest was reflected, it cooperated on a multilateral approach of the United States that 
sought a stable world order through the United Nations and multilateral trusteeships.44    
After a unity conference between Korean organizations in Seoul, Shanghai, and 
Siberia, the KPG was formed in Shanghai in 1919 with Syngman Rhee as the first 
President.45  The KPG asserted that it represented the entire Korean people and sought 
historical legitimacy as the successor of Chosun.46  Although the KPG was not 
internationally recognized, the ROK regards the KPG as its predecessor.47   
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As Japan advanced, the KPG followed the ROC to Chongqing.  It then created the 
Korean Restoration Army (KRA) in 1940 “with the special approval of Generalissimo 
Chiang Kai-shek,” and it was to “continue the war of resistance in cooperation with the 
people of the Republic of China and as a part of the Allied Forces in order to defeat the 
Japanese imperialists.”48  The Declaration of the Korean Restoration Army (KRA) 
emphasizes the Korean independence but states vaguely on Chiang Kai-shek’s role for 
the PGK.   
We are pleased that Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek . . . has adopted a far-
sighted policy regarding the Korean people. . . .  His moral support greatly 
encourages the movement for liberation of our nation and especially the 
preparation for armed resistance against oppressive Japanese enemy.49   
Although the ROC controlled the KRA, it did not properly provide command 
structure and adequate supply.50   
In December 1941, the KPG requested diplomatic recognition from the United 
States.  It declared war against the Axis powers and sought support from the Allies and a 
UN membership.51  Washington and London aligned their views closely with the ROC’s 
view on the KPG.52  Nevertheless, the ROC was “not enthusiastic” about the KPG and 
notified Washington that the factionalism within the KPG and continuing Japanese 
victories rendered it premature to consider the diplomatic recognition of the KPG.53  
However, the Sino-Japanese War in 1937 and the U.S. declaration of war against Japan 
brought together different factions among the Korean independence groups under the 
KPG.54  In addition, recognizing the KPG as the legitimate government of Korea would 
have weakened the Japanese claim on the Korean Peninsula.  Robert Myers suspects that 
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the ROC skeptically viewed the KPG’s leadership because of the Chinese “traditional 
low opinion of Koreans.”55  Consequently, Washington refused to recognize any 
particular Korean liberation organization and placed Korea under the “general 
dispensation” of Asian colonies at a later time; and this policy was unchanged and carried 
over to the Cairo Declaration in 1943.56   
The Chinese view weighed significantly on the issues of the liberation, 
independence, and division of Korea.  While the anti-Japanese activity of Korean 
independence groups may have benefitted China, the ROC did not recognize the KPG or 
any other Korean independence group, and this had a detrimental effect on the Korean 
Question.  Had the ROC recognized the PGK, its legitimacy and international recognition 
would have helped the exiled Korean leadership to consolidate different factions, but 
instead, the ROC overemphasized to Washington the factionalism in the Korean 
independence movement.57   
Korean nationalists asserted that the ROC did not recognize the KPG because it 
wanted to reassert its former influence over Korea after the fall of Imperial Japan.58  In 
fact, following a Qing method of dealing with Chosun, the ROC created a triumvirate 
which created further factionalism within the Korean independence movement as each 
ROC member insisted on his exclusive control.59  Furthermore, the Koreans resented that 
the ROC treated Korea as a frontier of China, similar to Tibet and Mongolia.60   
Korean diplomacy was not effective.  The Chosun court’s efforts toward a 
diplomatic solution for maintaining sovereignty failed in the 1890s when it briefly and 
frantically sought external powers to counterbalance each other, or to serve as a patron to 
Chosun.  Its final effort to send delegates to the Hague Conference to assert its 
sovereignty failed and caused the abdication of its king.  Despite the Koreans’ anti-
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Japanese efforts in Manchuria, the KPG failed to convince the ROC to recognize it as the 
legitimate government of Korea.  Because of the problems of weak funding and military 
power, the influence of the KPG was limited.61  While the KPG failed to convince 
Washington that it was the legitimate government of Korea, there was not an alternative 
organization to form a national government.   
External legitimization and support will continue to be important on the Korean 
Peninsula.  The reunification of Korea will be partly dependent on the Chinese policy 
regarding the DPRK and post-reunification order more so than the influence of the 
United States because Washington is in favor of for the absorption of the DPRK by the 
ROK.  The PRC remains as a stumbling block for the Korean reunification, as it 
considers the DPRK vital to its interest.     
C. THE PRC AND THE ROK SINCE 1949 
The Sino-Korean relations “started with hostility” as the ROK in 1948 recognized 
the ROC as the only legitimate government, while the PRC in 1949 recognized the 
DPRK as the only legitimate government.62  The PRC rescued the DPRK during the 
Korean War, the PRC-DPRK alliance opposed the U.S.-ROK alliance, and the 1960s 
Sino-ROK relationship was mutually hostile.  Nevertheless, from the mid 1970s, Seoul 
started approaching Beijing, and Beijing took its time until the 1980s to respond to Roh 
Tae-woo’s Northern Diplomacy.63  The Sino-ROK normalization in 1992 is significant in 
that Beijing and Seoul chose to overlook the past and focus on cooperation.  The ROK 
was finally able to obtain recognition from all major powers.  It closed the historical and 
cultural gap between China and Korea.   
The PRC intervened in the Korean War despite belligerent Taiwan, heavy 
inflation, and the remnants of the civil war in Sichuan, Guizhou, and Tibet.64  When Kim 
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Il-sung requested for the PRC military intervention in the Korean War, the PRC was less 
than one year old since its creation on October 1, 1949.  China suffered through a long 
civil war between the ROC and the CCP.  Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao argued for 
consolidating domestic power and avoiding an unfavorable fight against the nuclear 
United States, but Mao Zedong argued that the PRC inevitably had to fight against the 
United States.65     
This time, unlike the Sino-Japanese War, the PRC proved that it could fight off a 
major foreign power in its hemisphere of influence.  In the Korean War, the PRC proved 
that it was willing to sacrifice for the DPRK and that Beijing, and Pyongyang shared a 
mutual interest in security.   
Along with the heavy casualties of the war, the PRC sacrificed a chance to annex 
Taiwan or to become a member of the UN.66  Ironically, even though Beijing generously 
supported Pyongyang, Kim Il-sung manipulated the Sino-Soviet split for his gain.67  
Unlike the hegemony of the Qing, the PRC had a competing power in the region, as the 
dynamics of the power play in East Asia changed.   
The PRC prefers the DPRK as a buffer zone rather than a unified Korea under the 
American influence.68  Whereas the United States “pledged continued support for South 
Korea” in a joint communiqué of 1972, the PRC insisted on the withdrawal of all foreign 
forces.69  And then the sudden Sino-American rapprochement was followed by a joint 
communiqué in 1972 between Seoul and Pyongyang for a peaceful unification of Korea, 
independent of foreign intervention; and Beijing supported it because it wanted to 
maintain the stability in the Korean Peninsula and to avoid tension with Washington and 
Tokyo.70   
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In 1971, Seoul began to consider “diplomatic normalization with the Soviet Union 
and Communist China with flexibility and seriousness,” and it repeatedly signaled its 
intent to Beijing.71  The 1972 Nixon Shock gave an impetus for Seoul to seek 
rapprochement with Beijing, and in 1973, Park Chung-hee declared that Seoul desired to 
“establish relations with all socialist nations.”72  In 1988, Roh Tae-woo declared the 
same.73  However, domestic turmoil in Beijing from 1975 to 1977 prevented progress 
toward rapprochement.74   
As the PRC’s domestic politics became more pragmatic under Deng Xiaoping and 
Beijing adopted the open-door economic policy, in the 1980s, Beijing gradually sought 
cooperation in non-political matters.75  In 1983, to resolve the issue of a hijacked Chinese 
plane, Beijing and Seoul signed an official document, bearing the name of each state for 
the first time.76  Later that year, Beijing invited South Koreans to a UN conference in 
China.77  The Sino-Korean relation started to adopt a new tone and their hostility began 
to disappear.  The repeated signals for rapprochement from Seoul started receiving 
positive response from Beijing.        
In the 1980s, Beijing chose to lessen tension on the Korean Peninsula and 
informed Washington and Tokyo that the DPRK lacked capacity and intention to invade 
the ROK and Beijing would not support a DPRK invasion; but at the same time, Beijing 
acknowledged that due to the USSR and the DPRK’s Juche ideology, Beijing’s ability to 
influence Pyongyang was less than what it seemed.78  Beijing sought stability on the 
Korean Peninsula.  By going public with its intention, Beijing made clear to Pyongyang 
that Pyongyang would not receive help in case of a war triggered by the DPRK.  With the  
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collapse of the USSR, however, Beijing became the only patron of Pyongyang and shared 
common interests with Pyongyang in preserving the communist system, rejecting foreign 
interferences, and opposing the presence of the USFK79   
Even though the ROK was headed by a series of autocratic military leaders -- 
Park Chung-hee, Chun Doo-hwan, and Roh Tae-woo -- there had been a consistent 
foreign policy regarding improving relations with the PRC.  The groundwork for the 
success of the Northern Diplomacy was laid under military dictatorship in Korea.  Park 
Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan supported opening trade with the PRC.80  This 
consistency in foreign policy had the effect of convincing Beijing that Seoul was sincere 
about the normalization and cooperation.  Besides, Seoul had nothing to gain by 
aggravating Beijing and solidifying the Sino-DPRK alliance.   
One sign of the thaw in the Cold War was that both capitalist and communist 
countries participated in the 1988 Seoul Olympics.  The Seoul Olympics were 
meaningful for the rapprochement between the capitalists and the communists.  It also 
served a domestic purpose of placating mass demonstrations for democracy and labor 
movements, and it brought visitors to the remote peninsula.  The Seoul Olympics and the 
Beijing Asian Games in 1990 increased semiofficial contacts between Beijing and 
Seoul.81  Shortly after the Seoul Olympics, South Koreans attended a trade fair in 
Guangzhou and the Asian Development Bank in Beijing; and by 1990, regular 
transportation lines were opened between the ROK and the PRC.82   
Northern Diplomacy also benefitted from the investments in the PRC by private 
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were reluctant to invest in the PRC in the late 1980s.83  In 1991, Beijing and Seoul set up 
trade offices at each other’s national capitals; they fostered economic cooperation and 
acted on consular matters such as visas.84 
Jae-ho Chung observes that despite a separation of 97 years, from 1895 to 1992, 
the rapprochement between the PRC and the ROK seems natural because of geopolitical 
interests, trade, “emotions, sentiments, and perceptions.”85  He also theorizes that the lack 
of experience with the “real China” promoted a South Korean favorable sentiment toward 
China and “wishful expectation,” but more interaction might cause disappointment.86 
The USSR and the Soviet bloc responded to Seoul’s diplomatic efforts earlier 
than the PRC.87  Considering that the PRC and Japan signed the Treaty of Peace and 
Friendship in May 1978 and the PRC and the United States normalized their diplomatic 
relationship in 1979, the PRC showed much reluctance in normalizing relations with the 
ROK because of its close alliance with the DPRK and ideological commitment of the 
CCP leadership.  Beijing prefers the status quo in the Korean Peninsula so as not to deal 
with the U.S. presence in the ROK.     
The 1992 Sino-ROK normalization illustrates the political difficulty for Beijing in 
acknowledging the two-Koreas policy, as Beijing maintained an alliance with 
Pyongyang.  From the early 1980s to the Sino-ROK normalization in 1992, Beijing 
separated political and economic relations with Seoul, focused on non-political matters, 
and deliberately slowed the normalization because of Pyongyang.88  Both Seoul and 
Beijing approached normalization in a cautious and patient manner.   
Whereas Beijing gently signaled to Pyongyang the likelihood of the Sino-ROK 
normalization and gave time for Pyongyang to get used to the Sino-ROK rapprochement, 
however, Seoul kept the possibility of normalization secret and abruptly severed its 
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diplomatic tie with Taiwan.89  One wonders if the ROK’s abrupt behavior is a general 
characteristic of the ROK’s diplomatic style,90 and whether a similar behavior will be 
seen in the future.  Seoul calculated that Beijing was far more important than Taipei, 
despite the U.S. policy of strategic ambiguity.  Although the ROC was one of the first 
nations to recognize the ROK in 1949, when more benefits from the Sino-ROK relation 
were perceived by Seoul, Seoul had no qualms about severing its tie with Taiwan.     
Beijing and Seoul normalized in September 1992.  Whereas Beijing was able to 
assert its one China policy, it was impossible for Seoul to insist on a “one Korea” policy 
as both Tokyo and Washington previously abandoned Taipei for the normalization with 
the PRC.  At the same time, because of the unique situation of the divided peninsula, 
Seoul could have insisted on maintaining diplomatic relationships with both Beijing and 
Taipei.     
Seoul saw the tension around Taipei and did not want to get involved in the 
Taiwan question, although this could have provided Washington a useful tool for 
strategic ambiguity and flexibility by influencing its ally, the ROK, to adopt policies in 
favor of Taiwan.  However, Seoul was content to normalize with Beijing without the 
hassle of Taiwan and the possibility of incurring displeasure from Beijing.   
Pyongyang remains without diplomatic recognition from Washington and Tokyo.  
If Washington and other major powers allow Pyongyang to normalize, it would be 
interesting to see if Pyongyang desires outright normalization, or if Seoul would employ 
a gradual normalizing process similar to the Sino-ROK normalization.  Since Washington 
does not allow relations with Pyongyang to be normalized, it seems that Seoul is 
employing a slow and gradual rapprochement process through the economy, sports, and 
tourism, as was used in the rapprochement process with the PRC.  Seoul’s slow process 
of rapprochement with Pyongyang may help to placate Beijing.  The abrupt collapse of  
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the DPRK will cause concern in all powers as to who which military would occupy North 
Korea.  Given the historical tendency of China, it is inevitable that the PRC will send its 
troops to the DPRK in case of the DPRK’s collapse.     
It was notable that Seoul’s foreign policy displayed a consistency and patience in 
approaching Beijing for cooperation and ultimately the normalization.  Had the 
normalization not occurred, the ROK would have further deviated from the influence of 
and the contact with China.  The need for the U.S.-ROK would have been stronger.  
Perhaps with more time, South Koreans might have emerged with a much more separate 
identity from the Chinese than it already is.  Koreans and the Chinese were never the 
same.  The questions are whether Seoul can increase its legitimacy on the Korean 
Peninsula more so than Pyongyang in the eyes of Beijing and how much closer the Seoul 
and Beijing relationship will grow.   
D. THE PRC AND THE ROK SINCE 1992 
Sino-ROK normalization enhanced the international status of the ROK, weakened 
the Sino-DPRK alliance, forced Pyongyang to accept the ROK as a legitimate 
government, and improved the ROK’s economic prospects.91  Historically, the Qing 
legitimized the Chosun court by imperial investiture, and Chosun’s tribute obtained 
security.  Whereas the tribute system was imposed on Chosun, the ROK succeeded in 
establishing equal relations with China.  The challenges for the ROK are how to maintain 
its independent policy and in case of reunification by absorption how to obtain a total 
recognition from Beijing as a one nation.  A question may arise: if quid pro quo, would 
Seoul be willing to sacrifice the U.S.-ROK alliance or dissolve the UN command and the 
USFK?  Or would the reunified Korea assert its sovereignty and power in East Asia 
against the PRC’s hemisphere of influence?   
If Beijing fostered a closer relation with Washington, Seoul might not have to 
face the dilemma.  However, a deteriorating Sino-American relationship may test Seoul’s 
diplomatic skill.  For Seoul, if the trans-Siberia railroads and Siberian oil pipeline run 
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through Manchuria, along with geopolitical stability, the need for diplomatic tranquility 
and economic cooperation with Beijing will grow.  The extensive interconnectedness of 
the economies of the PRC and the ROK has already increased the importance of stability.  
The trade between Manchuria, the ROK, and perhaps the DPRK may increase.  The 
expanding trade may work in favor for Seoul to open up the DPRK economy and foster 
cooperative behavior.               
Since the 1992 normalization between the PRC and the ROK, their relationship 
has been labeled as “relations of friendship and cooperation” during the Roh Tae-woo 
administration, “cooperative partnership” during the Kim Dae-jung administration, and 
“comprehensive, cooperative partnership” during the Roh Moo-hyun administration.92  
Still, China’s closest diplomatic relationship is with the DPRK, termed a “traditional 
cooperative friendship.”93   
In 2008, President Hu Jintao and President Lee Myung-bak upgraded the bilateral 
relationship to “strategic cooperation” and agreed to communicate on foreign strategy to 
cooperate on telecommunication, nuclear power generation, and a Sino-Korean FTA, to 
expand cultural and personnel exchange, to promote stability in Northeast Asia, and to 
reform the UN.94  Earlier, in May 2008, for the first time since the 1978 normalization 
between the PRC and Japan, Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda and President Hu issued a 
joint statement and agreed to develop a “strategic reciprocal relationship” that 
acknowledges their different positions and yet pursue common interests.95  It seems that 
Beijing wants to foster regional cooperation, but Beijing sees it more practical and 
feasible to have Seoul closer than Japan.  Historically, Korea never formed an alliance 
with Japan.  Nevertheless, would Seoul display flexibility and consider allying with Japan 
if the Sino-American relation were to deteriorate?  Few Korean military strategists worry  
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about the rising military capability of the PRC, and yet Seoul has “maintained a sort of 
strategic ambiguity” as to whether the PRC is a direct threat and as to how to correspond 
to it.96 
E. THE ECONOMIC TIES BETWEEN THE PRC AND THE ROK 
Beijing prefers the economic success of the ROK over the dismal economy of the 
DPRK that became burdensome to the PRC.97  Former CCP General Secretary Hu 
Yaobang admitted that the developmental model of the ROK, Yugoslavia, and Romania 
influenced China’s open policy; and Beijing preferred the Korean export-driven 
economic model.98  Beijing discarded the economic growth models of Hong Kong, 
Singapore, and Taiwan due to scale and political issues.99  Overall, the ROK appealed to 
the PRC because of the ROK’s cooperation with the PRC’s economic priorities, its 
intermediate technology suitable for the Chinese economy, its proximity along the coast, 
and the historical unsuitability of Japan and Taiwan.100  Also, the PRC’s policy of 
delegating economic decisions to provinces helped to avoid political issues with 
Pyongyang.101    
As Beijing adopted pragmatism and a policy of separating business and politics, 
the PRC entered into an indirect trade with the ROK in 1979.102  The PRC started 
seeking business with all nations as long as profits existed.103  The indirect trade between 
the PRC and the ROK occurred mostly through Hong Kong, and the total indirect trading 
volume grew rapidly from $19 million (1979) to $280 million (1981).104  Certainly, this 
increasing amount of trades gave expectation to Beijing and Seoul that the future benefits 
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of economic cooperation would be significant.105  Economic cooperation preceded the 
politics and the normalization.  Oddly enough, a communist state and a capitalist state 
were linked by economic profits.     
Even before the normalization in 1992, in the 1980s, a number of the members of 
South Korean chaebols visited the PRC, and the ROK established the International 
Private Economic Council of Korea (IPECK) to facilitate economic cooperation with 
communist nations and invited Chinese economic delegations to the ROK.106  Seoul 
displayed a consistent policy in pursuing closer Sino-Korean economic cooperation, 
despite Korean labor unrest and the democratic movement against a series of Korean 
military regimes.   
Seoul was able to capitalize on the collapse of the Cold War, the Chinese 
domestic policy of pragmatism and economic growth, and the compatibility of economic 
goals.  Seoul saw that it was better to do what was feasible and displayed a savvy 
diplomatic foresight in establishing indirect trade.   
Economic cooperation built mutual interests between Beijing and Seoul and 
helped to thaw the Cold War enmity due to increasing expectation of profits.  Beijing 
began to see that the economic profits from dealing with the ROK was worth more than 
before but took time to allay any fear from the DPRK on the growing economic 
relationship between the PRC and the ROK.   
Seoul’s Northern Diplomacy and its understanding of the Chinese history also 
helped to establish official trade.  The ROK had a political purpose of ensuring the 
Chinese exports to the ROK even when the ROK was incurring a trade loss with the 
PRC.107  The ROK has pursued an export-driven economy and sought a trade surplus 
with the United States, but Seoul calculated that the trade deficit with the PRC still had 
the geopolitical advantage of befriending the PRC and diminishing the exclusive 
communication between Beijing and Pyongyang.   
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By 1988, the Sino-Korean trade went from a “closed secret, then to an open 
secret, and finally no secret whatsoever.”108  The economic cooperation between Beijing 
and Seoul benefitted both parties in a complementary way: the PRC provided resources 
and cheap labor, and the ROK provided technology and capital.109   The significance of 
the expanding Sino-Korean trade is that along with the desire for a stable North Korea, 
Beijing and Seoul shared a common economic interest, and the more their economies 
were interconnected, they were likely to seek for a closer relationship and face a common 
difficulty in economic cycles.  Nevertheless, if the Sino-ROK economic relationship 
becomes competitive, tension may come.    
The PRC and the ROK have rapidly grown closer politically and economically 
since the diplomatic normalization in 1992.110  In 2007, the bilateral trade between the 
PRC and the ROK amounted at $145 billion, $20.6 billion less than the combined trade 
with the United States ($83 billion) and Japan ($82.6 billion). 111  In 2003, the ROK 
invested $4.7 billion in China and $4.2 billion in the United States, and China became the 
largest market for the South Korean exports.112  Seoul has displayed an astute economic 
policy that foresaw initial trade deficits as an investment for a bigger return.  How long 
can the ROK maintain profits with China?  Although in the 1990s, the complementary 
nature of the Sino-ROK trading cemented the economic relationship, a competitive 
economic relationship is likely to appear in the long run.113     
The tribute system and Qing-Chosun trades heavily favored the Qing, and Chosun 
incurred an annual net loss.  Modern Korea finally has turned it around and is making a 
trade surplus with China.  However, as the PRC catches up with the ROK in exports 
markets such as ship construction and other Korean niche markets, the trade surplus with 
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the PRC might be temporary, and the ROK may experience fierce competition with the 
PRC.  As the world economy deteriorates and the PRC and the ROK compete for 
overlapping export markets and dwindling resources, there will be more economic 
tensions, and the conflicts of interests over profit may arise.   
As long as the geopolitical status quo can be maintained, Seoul will be pressured 
by the concern for the economic well-being of its citizens.  Economic security is a matter 
of big concern for the ROK.  An expansionary cycle of the world economy is preferable 
than a contracting world economy.  It remains to be seen how Beijing and Seoul will deal 
with each other in the current world recession.   
In order to ensure economic security, Seoul may adopt an economic policy of 
making the PRC’s economic infrastructure and technology dependent on those of the 
ROK.  Given the PRC’s understanding of Asian economics and their technological 
aspiration and manpower, however, the economic competition between the PRC and the 
ROK is inevitable.  The PRC may be able to replace the ROK with other nations or 
become self-sufficient in terms of the technological knowhow.  Once the PRC achieves 
technological advantage over the ROK, the economic system in East Asia may revert to a 
system similar to the situation in which China controlled the flow of money and made 
profits from the peripheral states.  The ROK may find it hard to increase per capita 
income.     
A break for the ROK may come through the cheaper wages and natural resources 
of the DPRK.  The reunification will necessarily utilize nationalism for economic unity, 
and Juche ideology may be modified to bring the North Koreans into the Korean 
economic model.  It is likely that Beijing would find Juche ideology repelling.  It will be 
interesting to see what policies Seoul pursues to make trade surpluses with the PRC and 
the United States, and its impact on the Sino-Korean relations and the U.S.-ROK alliance.          
F. THE CULTURAL TIES BETWEEN THE PRC AND THE ROK  
The Sino-DRPK alliance and the U.S.-ROK alliance opposed each other and 
created the cultural barriers between the DPRK and the ROK; and between the PRC and 
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the ROK.  While there was much influx of entertainment media from Hong Kong and 
Taiwan to the ROK, the mainland China did not influence the modern Korean culture, 
and much of the Chinese influence in this period in the ROK remained in the form of the 
Chinese classics of literature and philosophy.  Will the Chinese and Koreans find 
commonality from the Chinese classics and relate better with each other?   
The Sinocentric culture dwindled in the ROK as English emerged as the most 
emphasized foreign language and replaced the Chinese in significance due to the vast 
U.S. market while the Chinese market remained closed.  Christianity is the most 
prevalent religion in the ROK, unlike any other place in Asia except the Philippines.  The 
PRC remains atheistic.  The Cold War structure gave a chance for the ROK to remain at a 
distance from the Sinocentric world while maintaining a close relationship with the 
United States and the West.   
Interestingly, there has been a reversal of the direction of entertainment and 
culture as “Hallyu,” the Korean Wave, made its way into Chinese media and found wide 
popularity among the Chinese.  This would create Chinese curiosity about the Korean 
culture and history.   
In 2008, there were 444,000 Chinese immigrants in South Korea, comprising 44 
percent of the total number of immigrants while the Americans comprised 12 percent.114  
By the end of 2002, 36,093 (42.1 percent of all foreign students in China) South Korean 
students were studying in China compared to 49,046 South Korean students (8.4 percent 
of all foreign students) in the United States.115  In 2005, 43,000 (48 percent of all foreign 
students in China) South Koreans were in the PRC, and there were over half a million 
Korean residents in the PRC.116 
The rise of the number of South Korean students in China is remarkable.  It shows 
a rising inclination toward the Sinocentric world.  Before the fall of Chosun, Korean 
students went to China to further their education.  Then, during the colonial period, they 
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had to go to Japan.  When the United States gained pre-eminent influence on the ROK 
through its military and economic assistance, most Korean students came to the United 
States.  Nevertheless, Sino-Korean relations went through rapid rapprochement since 
1992 such that shifts and magnitude of cultural and economic exchange can be seen, 
though it is unclear if the PRC may replace the United States as the choice destination of 
Korean students and how much closer the Sino-Korean cultural and educational 
relationship will become.  As long as the United States remains as the world leader in 
knowledge, more qualified Korean students will study in the United States.   
The increasing number of exchange students in China may reflect the rising 
influence of China and also its much lower educational costs compared to those in the 
United States and the ROK.  If the economic class is the dividing line, richer and 
conservative students would tend to come to the United States while more proletariat and 
adventurous students would go to China.  Each class would exhibit different political 
leaning.          
The question remains as to whether South Koreans will revert to their traditional 
affinity to the Sinocentric culture or whether the influence of the United States and the 
West has left indelible marks that causes the South Koreans to see the Chinese as a much 
different identity.  The Koreans in the twentieth century went through radical economic, 
religious, educational, and governmental transformations in each generation due to the 
changes in international events.  The most salient difference between the ROK and the 
PRC are the ideological differences in the distribution of wealth, the preferred forms of 
government, and the religion.  South Koreans have a much different identity that survived 
the forceful assimilation into the Japanese culture during the colonial period.  They will 
see China as a foreign entity and are likely to resist assimilation into the Chinese culture.   
The Chinese under the communist influence have gone through cultural changes 
also, most notably during the Cultural Revolution.  The questions remain as to how and 
what degree the Koreans and the Chinese will find commonality and resolve conflicts 




demonstrationson the issues of melamine as there had been against the importation of the 
U.S. beef on the perceived fear of Mad-Cow Disease, anti-Chinese sentiment may 
emerge as more Sino-ROK incidents arise.   
South Koreans are aware that many tainted and fake agricultural products from 
the PRC are sold in the ROK.  During the Beijing Olympics, a nationalistic Chinese 
youth hit a South Korean professor.  A Chinese fisherman in the Korean territorial water 
killed a South Korean coast guard officer and escaped.  There are “uncivil faces of 
China,” Chinese maritime piracy, Chinese fishing vessel’s intrusion into the Korean 
territory, and Beijing’s repatriation of the North Korean refugees to the DPRK gulag 
system.117  The dust storm from the Gobi Desert and pollutions from the Chinese 
manufacturing industry reach the ROK.  If Seoul decides to join an international 
community concerned about the global warming and eco-friendly policy, there may be a 
conflict with Beijing.  Also, the Chinese diplomatic officials in the ROK have become 
“audacious” and “intrusive” in the Korean affairs.118  This audaciousness reminds the 
Koreans of the Qing empire.    
The more salient dividing point may present itself on if or how the PRC chooses 
to reveal its policy on the possible collapse of the DPRK.  If it is believed that the PLA 
will be sent to the DPRK for stabilization and border control, this will invoke the 
memories of the PLA participation in the Korean War that prevented the unification of 
the two Koreas.  The left wing of Korean politics may find itself unable to sustain its 
influence.  Even left-wing nationalists will oppose the PRC.  Korean nationalists and the 
right wing will gain power.  Most Koreans will see the PRC as a continuation of an 
empire that interfered with the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Korea.  Seoul will 
have to find a middle ground not to offend Beijing and yet placate the Korean populace 
with perhaps falling economic means due to the competition from the PRC.  South 
Koreans may find it unjust at the PRC’s reluctance for the ROK’s absorption of the 
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DPRK.  The elite of the ROK feel “uneasy” about rising China; most elite prefer the 
status quo and the U.S.-ROK alliance and agree that the U.S. presence is vital for the 
stability in East Asia.119 
Finally, there is the issue of religion.  Christianity is the predominant religion in 
South Korea.  Korean evangelists, whether Christian or Buddhists, may find the PRC a 
target for conversion if the PRC allows religious freedom.  Some Korean Christians are 
engaged in smuggling North Korean refuges across the PRC-DPRK border and do not 
agree with the Chinese policy of capturing and repatriating North Korean refuges.  The 
PRC’s intolerant policy on the North Korean refuge and religious freedom arouse 
resentment for the Korean evangelists.   
The earlier missionary works by the Americans since the late nineteenth century 
centered on the progressive ideas and liberation from Imperial Japan.  If Christianity is 
introduced from Korea to China, it will be interesting to see what elements might be 
introduced to the Chinese culture.  However, it is unlikely that the PRC will tolerate the 
incursion of foreign religion.  However, if so, Korea is poised to become a religious 
center in East Asia, and ultimately, the United States can claim that it has a part in 
religious influence on China since most Christian missionaries came from the United 
States.  It will be interesting to see if the Korean evangelists form an alliance with the 
American evangelists. 
Nevertheless, tourism may bring the Chinese and Korean cultures closer.  For the 
natural resources deprived ROK, export is a matter of national security.  Its efforts to 
diversify revenue via tourism will not be successful due to its remote location from the 
West and the harsh climate.  Seoul is nearly equidistant from Berlin, Sydney, and Hawaii.  
Rather, Asian tourists are likely to find South Korea as an attractive destination.  If 
tourism is increased, it is more likely to bring Asian and Korean cultures together, and it 
may form a tourism bloc.  The rise of oil prices may have a negative impact on Korean 
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tourists going outside to Western Europe and the United States.  More Koreans are likely 
to visit China due to proximity and low cost of travel.   
Sung-bin Ko recommends an independent diplomacy for Seoul and warns that 
cultural affinity and the South Koreans’ “irrationally friendly sentiment” may soon 
develop into “dependency” on China as the “traditional patron” of Korea.120  Contrary to 
Ko’s argument, however, at some point of time, the initially friendly attitudes of the 
Koreans towards the Chinese will begin to fade.  The Koreans and the Chinese have 
different identities.  Also, ultimately, it is not the culture but the geopolitical necessity 
that dominates international relations.   
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III.  THE FUTURE OF THE U.S.-ROK ALLIANCE  
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE U.S.-ROK RELATIONSHIP 
The Eisenhower administration wanted to make the ROK a “showcase of 
democracy.”121  After four decades or so, full democracy appeared, but the new Korean 
democracy did not look kindly on its benefactor as anti-Americanism swept throughout 
the society.  The Koreans perceived that Washington wanted democracy in Korea but 
often supported authoritarian Korean regimes during the Cold War.  Some alleged that 
Washington pursued an “anti-communist, pro-American alliance” rather than supporting 
democracy per se in the ROK.122  It is widely known that many described the U.S.-ROK 
relations as a client-patron system.  However, whereas the Qing-Chosun tributary system 
extracted Chosun’s national wealth, the U.S.-ROK client-patron system used economic 
and military carrots to institute desirable behavior in the ROK and helped the ROK to 
become strong.  Nevertheless, as the ROK matured in democracy, South Koreans have 
become assertive and resent foreign involvement in their domestic affairs.   
As the Cold War ended and the South Koreans began to enjoy better living 
conditions and freedom, people started voicing their resentment in the form of the anti-
Americanism rather than displaying their gratitude to the United States for guarding 
against the DPRK and providing much needed security and stability.  The conflict and 
tension between Washington and Seoul are only natural consequences of the U.S. policy 
of making the ROK a fully democratic nation.  The influence of Washington in Seoul 
gradually waned as the ROK grew in stature and capacity.  It will take time for 
Washington to fully appreciate the maturation of the Korean democracy.  It will take time 
for Seoul to understand the global strategic needs of Washington.   
The United States saved the ROK from the communism and helped it to recover 
by providing security and financial aid in contrast to the imperial practices of Qing and 
the brutal colonial rule by Imperial Japan.  For the first time in Korean history, it seemed 
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that Korea has finally found the answer to its geopolitical dilemma.  Powerful Japan is 
pacified under the restraint and umbrella of the United States.  The PRC and the DPRK 
are deterred by the presence of the United States Forces Korea (USFK).  Russia is now 
partially democratic and is far more concerned with its internal consolidation and 
European affairs.  The ROK is profiting from trade with the United States and China.  
The frequent demonstrations of anti-American sentiment and former President Roh Moo-
hyun’s balancer policy, however, eroded American confidence in South Korea as a 
dependable ally. Furthermore,  the United States is beginning to resent the ingratitude of 
the assertive South Koreans.  It remains to be seen how President Obama and President 
Lee Myung-bak will improve the U.S.-ROK alliance, and whether the worsening 
economic situation in the United States will necessitate a reduced footprint of the USFK 
in the Korean Peninsula.   
1. 1963 to 1993 
Unlike the Qing-Chosun tributary sytem, the client-patron system of the ROK and 
the United States was beneficial to Korea.  Seoul received much economic and military 
support from the United States.  Under the Mutual Security Act (MSA) from 1953 to 
1961, Washington provided $4.4 billion in military and economic aid to the ROK; under 
the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) from 1962 to 2002, Washington provided $9.9 billion 
in military and economic aid to the ROK; from 1946 to 2006, Washington provided $11.1 
billion in grants to Seoul and $3.8 billion in loans.123  In 2002, Washington stopped the 
military aid, and, since 2003, the economic aid has virtually stopped: as of September 
2006, the outstanding balance of the loans was at $307 million.124  The ROK improved 
its military and economic capacity, reduced its dependency on the United States, and was 
able to pull itself out of the client-patron system in the twenty-first century.       
For the strategic interests of the Cold War, Washington supported the 
authoritarian regimes of Syngman Rhee, Park Chung-hee, Chun Doo-hwan, and Roh Tae-
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woo.  The ongoing agenda for Seoul before 1993 was how to balance security, 
democracy, and economic prosperity.  While the populace wanted a full-scale democracy, 
the authoritarian governments of the ROK focused on the security against the DPRK and 
suppressed dissension against the military regimes.  South Koreans saw that, at times, 
Washington sacrificed democracy in Korea for its strategic need and the stability in the 
region.  Korean conservatives wanted security while liberals, nationalists, and anti-
authoritarian protesters clamored for full democracy.  Carter’s human right policy was 
the saving grace for the United States.   
In fact, many times, Washington admonished Seoul to be more democratic.  For 
example, Washington leveraged economic and military aid to pressure Syngman Rhee to 
be less authoritarian, and Kennedy urged Park Chung-hee to turn the regime over to a 
democratic process,125  Reagan, however, supported Chun Doo-hwan’s authoritarian 
military government.  When the USSR invaded Afghanistan in 1979, Washington saw the 
Korean Peninsula as a vital front against communism.126   After all, while Saigon fell in 
1975, the ROK was a symbol of success of the U.S. fight against the communism.         
It also strengthened the legitimacy for the authoritarian regime.  Military tension 
on the Peninsula and anti-communism became tools for the military regime to divert the 
focus from the issues of democracy to the fear over security.  The military regime used 
the issues of security to clamp down on the dissenters.  It heightened the sense of hostility 
between Seoul and Pyongyang and hampered the democratic flourishing in the ROK.  
Therefore, the military regime had to gain support from external powers.  Had 
Washington supported the Korean dissenter movement, the military regime would have 
had a tough time to maintain its power.   
The authoritarian regimes before the Roh Tae-woo administration in 1988 had to 
maintain a close relationship with Washington.  Washington preferred a regime that was 
strongly anti-communist.  Seoul wanted the market and security provided by the United  
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States.  Because the United States was the major export market for the ROK, Washington 
could have pressured Seoul for a political change, but it preferred stability over the 
uncertainty of a democratic government.   
Seoul’s priorities were security, economic growth, and democracy.  Democracy 
had to give way to the immediate need for the security and economic growth.  
Democracy had to be closely guarded against the irrationality of the mass democracy.  
Given the real security concerns about the belligerent DPRK and the autocratic and 
undemocratic disposition of the South Koreans in this period, it was not possible for full 
democracy to flourish.  It may have been too early for the ROK to enjoy a full democracy 
since it takes time for a generation to learn the democracy and for the older authoritarian 
generation to pass away.  
One aspect of the U.S.-ROK alliance is the security anxiety felt by Seoul and the 
frequent reassurance of Washington about the security of the ROK.  The Nixon Doctrine, 
the withdrawal of 24,000 U.S. troops in the ROK in 1973, the fall of Saigon in 1975, and 
Kim Il-sung’s visit to Beijing in 1975 caused anxiety in Seoul such that in 1977, Park 
Chung-hee sought the development of nuclear weapons.127  The Park regime saw the 
DPRK as a real threat.  Park Chung-hee was concerned with economic growth.  The 
withdrawl of the USFK meant a heightened threat level, a dangerous signal to 
Pyongyang, and expenditure of national budget for the self-defense.  For a poor nation 
with no credit line, it was hard to pursue both security and economic growth.  If more 
were to be spent on security, economic growth would have to be postponed.  The 
economic growth was vital not only for the welfare of the Koreans, but also to achieve a 
stronger military and an independent policy.   
Carter’s policy to withdraw all ground troops from the ROK was met with fear in 
Seoul, believing that such a move would send a wrong signal to Moscow and Beijing.128   
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After Washington pulled out the U.S. military from Korea in 1948, the Korean War 
erupted.  Along with U.S. economic aid, the presence of the USFK provided useful 
leverage in the Korean politics.   
While the Carter-Chun era was marked with Washington’s focus on the human 
rights issue in the ROK, the Reagan-Chun era became more harmonious as Washington 
focused more on anti-communism and overlooked the human right issues in the ROK,129 
but the anti-Americanism started spreading in the 1980s.130  In the late 1980s, as the 
South Korean economy and stature improved, the “client state behavior” of the ROK 
diminished.131    
Although many blame the United States for the client-patron system, the ROK 
gained security, and its economy grew.  Though full democracy came later than Korean 
dissenters wanted, the period before the 1990s laid the groundwork for democracy.  
Education, the media, living standards, and understanding of democracy improved over 
this period.  Tension came from the impatience of the Korean nationalists, who 
prematurely asked for full democracy.  At the same time, one can argue that the military 
regimes and the presence of the USFK heightened the security anxiety felt by Pyongyang.  
Veterans of the Korean War were at the helm of the military regime.  They perceived the 
DPRK as the enemy.  A similar circumstance arose in the DPRK leadership.   
At times, there existed a mismatch of the priorities of Washington and Seoul. 
When Seoul was militant, Washington sought to restrain Seoul from provoking 
Pyongyang.  When Park Chung-hee became belligerent against the DPRK, Washington 
discouraged Seoul from seeking a unification by military means and instead supported 
inter-Korean dialogue.132  There was disharmony between Chun and Carter’s human 
rights policy.  One common approach between Washington and Seoul, however, was that 
security preceded democracy.  Even Carter stopped withdrawing the USFK.    
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The ROK served as a symbolic and real bastion of the fight against the 
communism.  Japan did not have to face an immediate threat from the communism 
because of the security parameters around the ROK.  Overall, the ROK benefitted greatly 
from the help and the economic support of the United States.  Though there are those 
who lamented the suppression of democracy, it was a historical necessity.  Compared to 
the Qing-Chosun tributary system, the client-patron system was far more beneficial for 
the ROK.  Unlike the Qing-Chosun tributary system, the client-patron system 
economically and militarily helped the ROK.  It also allowed the ROK to grow out of the 
client-patron system.  It is evident what the ROK has achieved under the United States 
and the current decrepit status of the DPRK under its close relationship with the PRC.   
2. 1993 to the Present 
The fully democratic and economically successful ROK has become more 
assertive.  In recent years, the ROK has ranked between tenth to thirteenth largest GDP 
with the fifth largest foreign reserves and fourth largest total number of new patents.133  
Before 1993, the ROK had to withstand communism, achieve democracy, and 
expand the economy.  Whether it was due to the patience of Washington or the 
impatience of the Korean citizens, the status of democracy was much improved in the 
1990s.  Democracy had the effect of lessening the ROK’s former belligerent policy 
against the DPRK.  The civilian leaders were less hostile toward the DPRK than the 
military leaders.   
The rise of democracy and anti-Americanism helped to bring former dissidents to 
the Blue House.  Democratically elected leaders, such as Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-
jung, are well known for their struggle against the authoritarian military regimes of the 
ROK, and when the populace elected them to the office, they gained their legitimacy 
from the people.   
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The new civilian leaders were able to employ more independent policy from the 
influence of Washington because the ROK had achieved better economic and military 
strength.  When Kim Young-sam was democratically elected in 1993, he proclaimed that 
Since [the military leaders] assumed the presidency illegally or 
undemocratically, they had no authority.  Therefore, they had to depend upon 
Washington for its support of their respective authorities . . . As the 
democratically elected president, I don’t have to bow to the U.S. president.134 
The policy of Seoul reflected the changed demands of citizens and the civilian 
members of the government.  Seoul seeks to become less dependent on Washington.135  
Nevertheless, Seoul has to accommodate the U.S. policy without compromising its 
independent policy because of the necessity for the security provided by the United 
States.136  Even if it has improved its economic and military capability, the presence of 
the USFK is vital to the security of the region.     
Kim Young-sam sought a hardliner approach toward Pyongyang while Clinton 
sought engagement with Pyongyang.137  Clinton admonished Kim Young-sam against a 
strategic retaliation against the DPRK after the discovery of a DPRK submarine in the 
ROK territory in 1996.138  Washington initially welcomed Kim Dae-jung’s Sunshine 
Policy, but disagreement arose on the nuclear issues of the DPRK; Seoul viewed 
Clinton’s policy on Pyongyang as a hardliner while Washington viewed the Sunshine 
Policy as too lenient toward Pyongyang.139  The George W. Bush presidency and the axis 
of evil speech “fundamentally altered” U.S.-ROK relations.140  Tension between 
Washington and Seoul was the highest during Roh Moo-hyun’s administration.141  Bush 
and Roh held fundamentally different visions.  Bush turned the U.S.-ROK clock back to 
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the Reagan era of an ideological fight against communism.  Thus, since the 1990s, U.S.-
ROK relations worsened with each administration as Seoul discarded its previous 
hawkish approach to Pyongyang and adopted the Sunshine Policy.  The DPRK was the 
major issue of tension between Washington and Seoul.  Eight years of the Bush 
administration worsened the U.S.-ROK alliance, the perception of the Koreans on the 
U.S. policy, the DPRK nuclear issue, and the inter-Korean relationship.   
Roh Moo-hyun is well known for his anti-Americanism.  Nevertheless, he desired 
the status quo in regard to the U.S.-ROK alliance and chose to send the ROK troops to 
Iraq.142  There was a long debate in the ROK parliament as to whether and how many 
troops to send to Iraq.  The Iraq Invasion was a very unpopular issue in the ROK.  Seoul 
did not want to offend the Middle East since they depend on their oil.  The chance of 
Islamic terrorism in the ROK is nil because of Seoul’s indifferent stance on the issues of 
Israel, its remote location, and the lack of an Islamic population.  Nevertheless, Roh 
decided to reciprocate for the U.S.-ROK alliance, but in a much smaller number of non-
combatant soldiers compared to the peak number of 50,000 South Korean combatant 
soldiers in the Vietnam War.  
Unlike Washington’s desire for regime collapse or change, Seoul wants to 
maintain the status quo in the Korean Peninsula.  It has not vociferously complained 
about the major powers’ wish for the status quo in the division of the Korean Peninsula 
although this hampers the reunification.  Despite Roh Moo-hyun’s support for the U.S.-
ROK alliance, Seoul and Washington have different views on the DPRK threat, the 
nonproliferation of the WMD, and the stability.143   
Although the ROK and China have grown closer and despite the anti-
Americanism, Seoul wants to maintain its close relationship with the United States.144  
President Lee Myung-bak reaffirmed that the USFK contributes to “the peace and 
                                                 
142 Selig S. Harrison, “South Korea-U.S. Alliance Under the Roh Government,” Nautilus Institute, 
April 11, 2006. 
143 Ehrhardt " US-ROK Security Consultation," 665. 
144 Kang, China Rising, 120. 
 41
stability in East Asia and beyond Northeast Asia.”145  Seoul and Washington have a ritual 
of mutual reassurance for the alliance.  Lee Myung-bak wants to repair the U.S.-ROK 
relationship and stressed common objectives with regard to the DPRK.146  President Bush 
and Lee Myung-bak met again in August 2008 in an effort to strengthen the U.S.-ROK 
alliance based on the “values of free democracy and market economy”, to address 
Pyongyang’s denuclearization and human rights issues, and to intensify effort to pass the 
U.S.-ROK FTA.147  It remains to be seen how Presidents Obama and Lee would form a 
common vision. 
B. THE CHALLENGES FOR THE U.S.-ROK ALLIANCE 
1. Anti-Americanism 
Most Korean surveys from 1988 to 2005 reveal a rising trend that South Koreans 
favor the PRC over the United States.148  Before the 1980s, anti-Americanism was not 
evident, but in the early 1980s, 62 percent of Korean responders (20 to 39 years old) 
indicated anti-Americanism.149  Another survey indicates a clear generational divide: the 
older generation favored the United States far more than the younger generation.150  
Jinwung Kim believes that anti-Americanism is inevitable because of changed 
demographics and a changed relationship between Washington and Seoul.151  Surveys 
from 1990 to 1992 indicate that 76.2 percent of anti-Americanism stems from economic 
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and political resentment, and 20.8 percent was related to nationalism.152  It appears that 
anti-Americanism is an expression of discontent when self-interest is not served.   
The causes of anti-Americanism are numerous.  Kim Seung-hwan points to the 
U.S. military bases in Korea, South Korean media’s bias against the United States, and 
resentment of U.S. policy.153  Other sources of anti-Americanism include U.S. policy 
toward the DPRK, historical perceptions, cultural differences, the neoliberal prescription 
for the Asian Financial Crisis, and the influence of South Korean left-wing political 
leaders.154  Some other causes are anti-Western sentiment, anti-capitalism, the fear of a 
nuclear war, and the resentment against the hegemonic power.155   
Washington can improve the U.S.-ROK alliance and reduce the negative impact 
of anti-Americanism by looking at the causes of the anti-Americanism and undertake 
changes.  This section looks at the history and causes of anti-Americanism.  Though the 
ways of reducing anti-Americanism are apparent, it can only reduce the level of anti-
Americanism.   
Tim Shorrock sees the U.S. support of President Chun Doo-hwan during and after 
the Kwangju Uprising in 1980 as the pivotal point that expanded anti-Americanism.156  
Many Korean intellectuals became disillusioned by U.S. policy and thought that  
Washington’s support for South Korean dictator regimes hampered the democratic 
progress.157  Before the Reagan-Chun regime, anti-Americanism lacked a cause and wide 
support base.158    
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Prior to the early 1980s, the United States was the “the virtuous country”; it was 
“the friend,” “liberators,” and “savior” from the North Korean invasion in 1950.159  By 
the late 1980s, however, anti-Americanism had permeated despite the Korean military 
regimes’ suppression of the anti-Americanism.160  In the 1960s and 1970s, most South 
Korean dissidents believed that Washington sympathized with a constitutional democracy 
against the authoritarian regime of President Park Chung-hee.161  After the December 12, 
coup by Lieutenant-General Chun Doo-hwan and the Kwangju Massacre in 1980, the 
struggle against the Chun regime became a “nationalist struggle for independence from 
foreign intervention.”162  Disappointment and frustration for achieving democracy in 
South Korea changed into anti-Americanism.  It was the perceived policy of the United 
States that the anti-American South Koreans opposed.  It was the perceived support of 
Washington on the continuation of the military regime in Seoul that South Koreans 
opposed.  
In a 1982 poll, 61.6 percent of South Koreans chose the United States as the most 
favored nation, and 58.1 percent of Koreans were satisfied with the U.S.-ROK 
relationship.163  By 1990, the number was down to 38.7 percent.164  Before the 1990s, 
anti-Americanism was prevalent among the educated people, but the Kwangju Massacre 
permeated anti-Americanism throughout the society.165   
Another source of anti-Americanism stems from the issue of the Korean 
reunification.  Although Washington officially supports the ROK agenda for the 
reunification, some believe that Washington desires a status quo in the Korean 
peninsula.166  In 1990, 79 percent of South Koreans blamed the United States for the 
division of Korea, and 64 percent responded that Washington was reluctant to see the two 
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Koreas reunified.167  In 1999, 89 percent wanted to maintain the U.S.-ROK alliance, but 
by 2002, the number was down to 56 percent.168   
It is unreasonable that the Koreans blame the United Sates for the division of the 
Korean Peninsula.  The ROC did not recognize the KPG.  In 1947, the USSR and the 
DPRK prevented a general election under a UN watch that would have produced one 
Korea.  In 1950, the PRC intervened in the Korean War and prevented the reunification.  
South Koreans, however, still believe that Washington’s vague policy since the 
conferences at Cairo, Yalta, and Potsdam “amounted to a tacit invitation to the Russians 
to occupy the Peninsula, setting in train the events that led to the division.”169  Harrison 
explains that South Koreans feel that the United States owes Korea because it discarded 
the Preparatory People’s Republic (PPR) under Yo Un-hyong and the trusteeship 
arrangement for the eventual reunification.170  Instead, the United States supported 
Syngman Rhee.       
The United States is also blamed for the Kwangju Massacre in 1980.  South 
Koreans believe that the United States is “at least partially responsible” for allowing the 
former dictator Chun to suppress the Kwangju demonstrators and that the United States 
was using South Korea as a Cold War pawn for its own strategic interests rather than to 
promote the human rights and democracy in the ROK.171  An unpublished 1978 
agreement reveals that the ROK had the operational control those activities “not directly 
concerned on a daily basis with the nation’s forward defense.”172   Regardless, South 
Koreans felt “despair and betrayal” at U.S. support for the Chun regime.173  During the 
Reagan era, the U.S.-ROK relationship was good on the surface, and Washington 
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reassured the ROK of its commitment for the security based on anti-communism.174  
Reagan’s support for Chun, however, intensified anti-American sentiment.175  
U.S. support for the Chun regime was contrary to a U.S. intervention in South 
Korean domestic affairs when Washington “virtually ordered” Syngman Rhee to resign 
during the 1960 students’ democratic uprising.176  Washington has faced a no-win 
situation dilemma in which if the United States acts forcefully, it is perceived as 
“imperial,” and if it does not, then it may be seen as indifferent to democracy.177  Either 
action may become a fodder to the anti-Americanism.178  South Korean opposition 
leaders and human rights activists criticized the Reagan administration’s “quiet 
diplomacy” on human rights abuse by the Chun regime.179 
An ongoing source of tension is the SOFA agreement.  From 1966 to 1987, the 
Korea courts handled only 0.7 percent of 39,453 crimes by the U.S. soldiers whereas 
European courts handled 32 percent of the U.S. military crimes and the Filipino courts 
handled 21.2 percent.180  Harrison argues that the 1966 SOFA did not give parity to the  
ROK as it did to the NATO nations and Japan; furthermore, the revision in 1991 did not 
improve much for the ROK until the revision in 2000 agreed to turn over serious 
crimes.181   
The American neoliberal effort to open up the South Korean economy has been 
an ongoing source of tension.  When Washington demanded opening up the South 
Korean market in the mid 1980s, farmers, previously pro-American, protested.182  The 
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mass demonstration in 2008 against the Mad-Cow disease shows that anti-Americanism 
can become a tool for economic interests.   
In 1988, Washington revoked duty-free trade privileges for the ROK, Taiwan, 
Singapore, and Hong Kong.183  Anti-Americanism worsened when Washington pushed 
for more economic liberalization in South Korea.184  The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis 
intensified the anti-Americanism as the American businesses bought South Korean 
companies at a bargain price.  In this case, anti-Americanism stems from economic 
friction between Seoul and Washington.  Unless Seoul adopts a totally open trade policy 
and while the Korean economic system is based on exports, this form of anti-
Americanism will remain.   
One of the underlying sources of the anti-American sentiment arises out of the 
cultural differences between the United States and Korea.  Seung-hwan Kim recommends 
that the Americans should be aware of “traditional Korean emotionalism” and stop using 
policies that can be perceived as “arrogant.”185  In some instances, however, no matter 
how cautious a U.S. policy is, it may result in an unwanted friction.  The South Korean 
reaction to a U.S. pressure is often nationalistic, and since the mid-1980s, Korean 
officials complained about the “American callousness, complacency, arrogance, laziness, 
and lack of empathy for Korean problems.”186  
A Gallup Korea poll in 1993 showed that 66 percent of South Koreans had a 
favorable view of the United States, and other polls showed that the number dropped to 
58 percent in 1999-2000 and 46 percent in 2003.187  The 2002 “axis of evil” speech  
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increased the anti-Americanism.188  The Koreans believed that the Bush administration 
jeopardized South Korea’s national security by inflaming the DPRK and opposing the 
Sunshine Policy.189 
Nevertheless, the Pew Research Center in 2007 showed that the Korean 
perception on the United States has improved since 2002.190  The Koreans with favorable 
views on the United States registered at 58 percent, 52 percent, 46 percent, and 58 
percent in the years, 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2007; 70 percent of South Koreans held 
favorable views on Americans, and Korea in 2007 was the sixteenth nation with the most 
favorable sentiment on the United States after India and Japan, while China was at thirty-
sixth, Germany at thirty-eighth, and Turkey at the bottom, forty-seventh.191  This is an 
improvement since the early 1990s.  South Koreans like the American people but not 
necessarily U.S. policy.  The perspectives of Seoul and Washington are naturally 
different, and South Koreans should not blame Washington for serving its interests.  
Despite the fluctuation in the anti-American sentiment, the U.S.-ROK alliance has 
endured.   
Perhaps, if democracy in the Middle East is feasible, the history of the U.S.-ROK 
relationship may give insights into how it may unfold.  The democratization of the ROK 
and its relationship with Washington has been tumultuous.  Seoul’s policy necessarily 
reflected the 1980s generation who occupied the power in recent years.  Like the Korean 
War generation with pro-American sentiment faded away, the 1980s generation will fade 
away also.  Those who were born after 1980s have not seen much cause for anti-
Americanism unless the older generation transmits anti-Americanism to the next 
generation.   
Despite rising anti-Americanism, the U.S.-ROK alliance is stable because of the 
mutual recognition of the geopolitical needs in the region.  However, there is a need for 
                                                 
188 Kim, “Anti-Americanism in Korea,” 109-111. 
189 Ibid., 109-110. 
190 “Global Unease with Major World Powers: Rising Environmental Concern in 47-Nation Survey. 
2007,” Pew Research Center, June 27, 2007, 4, 13, 16, 17. 
191 Ibid. 
 48
the U.S. military to be more sensitive to the demands of the Koreans.  As long as the U.S. 
military and Washington accommodate a certain level of the demands of the Koreans, 
there should not be much trouble for the U.S.-ROK alliance.   
2. The Conflict between the Balancer Policy and the Strategic Flexibility 
Whereas Chosun clung onto the status quo at each time of change, the ROK is 
now showing more flexibility in its foreign policy.  It is trying to redefine the U.S.-ROK 
alliance in recognition of its grown status.  One thing is certain that the ROK would be 
reluctant to revert to Chosun’s role as a tributary state or earlier ROK’s status as a client 
of the United States.   
The nadir of the U.S.-ROK alliance was during the era of George W. Bush and 
Roh Moo-hyun of the 1980s anti-government and human rights demonstration era.  Roh 
Moo-hyun and Bush held opposing views regarding the DPRK, and Washington’s 
unilateral policy generated much tension in the U.S.-ROK relationship.  Roh Moo-hyun 
and President Bush did not have a good relationship nor a similar strategic vision.  The 
biggest challenge for the U.S.-ROK alliance was that Washington and Seoul do not share 
a common vision for the future and the DPRK.  It remains to be seen how Lee Myong-
bak will improve the U.S.-ROK alliance with the Obama administration. 
Roh Moo-hyun wanted to establish a strategic and diplomatic balance between 
Washington and Beijing.192  Roh Moo-hyun sought to have the United States request 
permission to use the Korean bases for military operations in Asia eroded the perceived 
strength of the U.S.-ROK alliance.193  Washington wants strategic flexibility and desires 
to contain the DPRK and the PRC, but Roh Moo-hyun wanted to limit the scope of the 
U.S.-ROK alliance to the Korean Peninsula.194  Taik-young Hamm believes that the 
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advanced technology rendered the ROK far more superior to the DPRK and that the 
USFK became a “surplus defense asset.”195   
In 1999, the Kim Dae-jung administration displeased Washington when Seoul 
decided not to join the Theater Missile Defense (TMD) Plan and refrained from 
discussing China-related matters at the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group 
(TCOG).196  The TCOG had the potential to institutionalize the cooperative behavior into 
a “virtual alliance” among the United States, Japan, and the ROK, but Seoul and Tokyo 
are unlikely to form a security alliance unless the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute is 
resolved.197   
Seoul also decided not to be a part of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) 
because Seoul wanted to avoid issues directly affecting the DPRK although allegedly the 
PSI did not specifically pinpoint the DPRK.198  Seoul is asserting more independence 
away from Washington’s influence.   
One apparent reason for the focus on the strategic flexibility of Washington is due 
to the U.S. involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan and the war against terror.  The U.S. 
involvements in Afghanistan and Iraq have reduced Washington’s military attention to 
Asia.199  Also, as the PRC rises, tension in the U.S.-ROK alliance came from Seoul’s 
efforts to establish a strategic and diplomatic balance between the United States and the 
PRC.200  One possible scenario is that the United States can assume an “offshore-
dominant” role and let the ROK assume larger share of its own security.201   
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3. The Conflict between the U.S. Policy on the DPRK and the Sunshine 
Policy 
The Sunshine Policy initiated under the Kim Dae-jung administration became a 
contentious issue between Washington and Seoul.  Since the 1994 North Korean Nuclear 
Crisis, Washington and Seoul have insisted on its own approach, perhaps mutually 
detrimental to its intended goal.  Washington felt “sidelined” as Seoul actively pursued to 
reduce tensions with Pyongyang.202  Many South Koreans have reduced threat perception 
on the DPRK and “pity” rather than “fear” the DPRK.203  The ROK still provides aid 
even when the DPRK moved equipments back to the reactor site.204  Pyongyang has built 
a more capable ICBM even as Washington has tried to dissuade Pyongyang’s nuclear 
ambition.205  South Koreans are likely to blame the DPRK’s nuclear program on the 
failed policy of the Bush administration on Pyongyang.   
Washington had been hawkish on the DPRK nuclear issue.  The hawks argued for 
regime change as the most effective way to solve the nuclear and human rights issue in 
the DPRK.206  They argue that a rogue state is not “reformable,” it is wrong to support 
such a “morally apprehensible” state, and engagement ultimately increases “moral 
hazard” for other rogue nations.207  
Believing that the primary motivation of “malignant narcissist” Kim Jong-il for 
the development of nuclear weapons is to militarily reunify the two Koreas, in 2003 the 
National Institute for Public Policy (NIPP) recommended deterrence against and coercion  
on the DPRK.208  Terry Stevens et al. advocated for missile defense, the PSI, and 
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isolating Pyongyang, which could “contribute to the destabilization of regime,”209 but 
they did not mention the unpalatable casualty in the Korean Peninsula in case of a 
conflict.  For Koreans and Chinese, the collapse of the DPRK has an immediate impact 
on stability and economic prosperity.   
While the Bush administration had refused to negotiate directly with Pyongyang 
since 2002, Pyongyang processed plutonium and tested a nuclear device.210  Miroslav 
Nincic argues that Washington has not been successful in its use of “punitive 
diplomacy.”211  Paul Chamberlain asserts that “the Bush administration empowered 
North Korea to become a nuclear weapons state.”212  Michael Green believes that the 
policy of regime change opposes the current goal of the Six-Party Talks, and the collapse 
of the DPRK can increase the proliferation of the WMD technology.213     
Washington’s hawkish stance against Pyongyang is in contrast with Seoul’s rather 
overly lenient approach under the Roh Moo-hyun administration.  Under the Sunshine 
Policy, Seoul provided assistance to Pyongyang without quid pro quo.214  Engagers 
believe that Pyongyang’s feeling of insecurity and the lack of communication with Kim 
Jong-il pose obstacles, but in order to pursue denuclearization, Washington must 
convince Pyongyang that it desires a behavioral change, not regime change.215   
Unable to convince Washington to abandon its hawkish stance against 
Pyongyang, Seoul implemented its engagement policy through the rail and highway 
across the DMZ, the Kaesong Industrial Complex, and tourism.216  Engagement policy 
and aid, however, enable Pyongyang to maintain a nuclear program and military such that 
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it self-defeats its intended goal.217  Previously, Seoul’s approach of using economic 
means was shown to be effective when Seoul tried to normalize diplomatic relation with 
Beijing.  If Seoul does not seek the collapse of the DPRK, which will be a cause for the 
PLA to move into collapsed North Korea, it might as well sustain or improve the 
economic condition of the DPRK.  As more time passes under the Korean armistice, the 
succeeding generations of North Koreans may develop a reduced perception of the 
security threat.  An improved economy in the DPRK and the prolonged separation, 
however, may reduce the chance for the reunification.          
The DPRK’s nuclear test in October 2006 confirmed the failure of the policies by 
Washington and Seoul; furthermore, it seems that Pyongyang used negotiations as a 
delaying tactic and had intended to develop the nuclear weapons regardless.218  In 2005, 
Pyongyang displayed “complete disinterest” in energy assistance from Seoul.219  The 
Agreed Framework, the October 2000 Joint Communiqué, the September 2005 Joint 
Statement, the February 2007 Joint Agreement repeat the same agenda without much 
progress.  Between Washington and Pyongyang, there was no full political and economic 
normalization, no liaison offices in each capital, and no economically beneficial 
cooperation and exchange.  In October 2008, the Bush administration finally removed the 
DPRK from the list of terrorism-sponsoring nations.220   
In 2007, the Atlantic Council recommended reciprocity, bilateral negotiation,  a 
“comprehensive settlement” on military, political, economic, and nuclear issues, a formal 
cessation of hostilities, economic and diplomatic carrots, a new multilateral regional 
security regime of Northeast Asia, military confidence building measures, and 
synchronizing Washington’s and Seoul’s policy toward Pyongyang.221  There is a need to 
                                                 
217 The Atlantic Council Working Group, “Framework for Peace and Security.”  
218 Green, "Nuclear Shockwaves,” 9-10. 
219 Ibid., 11. 
220 Helene Cooper, “U.S. Declares North Korea Off Terror List,” The New York Times, October 12, 
2008. 
221 The Atlantic Council Working Group, “Framework for Peace and Security,” 31-32.   
 53
eliminate Pyongyang’s assertion of the imminent security threat by the United States that 
justifies Pyongyang’s oppressive regime.222   
Chamberlain believes that coercive diplomacy is counterproductive and argues for 
“[c]onstructive, [c]omprehensive [d]iplomacy” that addresses Pyongyang’s security 
paranoia and xenophobia through negotiations.223  If Washington and Seoul can agree on 
a common approach, even if it may not work, the U.S.-ROK alliance will strengthen, and 
anti-American sentiment arising out of policy difference may be reduced.          
C. THE U.S.-ROK ALLIANCE AND EAST ASIA 
Many Americans regards Japan and Australia as more dependable allies than the 
ROK, and Seoul was concerned when Condoleeza Rice called the ROK a “global 
partner” and Japan and Australia as “allies.”224  Washington is relying more on Japan as 
a counter to China.225  As Washington fosters a triangular alliance between the United 
States, Japan, and Australia, Washington might downgrade the importance of the U.S.-
ROK alliance.226   
If the U.S. economy continues to face challenges, Washington may consider even 
further reducing the U.S. presence in the ROK.  As the presence of the United States 
lengthens and the Korean economy has grown, tensions arose on the issue of burden 
sharing for the U.S. troops in Korea.227  The direct cost of maintaining the U.S. troops in 
Korea amounts to $2 billion annually, but depending on a method of accounting, the 
actual annual total cost could go up to $42 billion.228   
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Between 1995 and 2004, Americans placed Japan as a top-ten ally whereas in the 
same period, the ROK was placed only once at top-ten after dispatching 3,000 ROK 
troops to Iraq in 2003.229  In 2002, Americans chose the ROK as the top-five most 
“unfriendly” nations toward the United States.230   
The majority of South Koreans perceive Japan as the most threatening state.231  In 
2002, more than 90 percent of Korean responders were against Japanese rearmament and 
66 percent of the ROK legislators believed that Japan is the biggest threat to East Asia.232  
South Koreans might be more favorable toward rising China than a resurgent Japan.233  
Chung worries that if Japan becomes more militarily assertive, Seoul may move closer to 
Beijing.234  As long as Washington acts as the mediator of Tokyo and Seoul, or if the 
relations between Tokyo and Seoul improve, Chung, however, would not have to worry.    
The U.S.-ROK alliance helps to allay any fears of Japanese military capability 
and intent in the minds of South Koreans.  A strong presence of the U.S.-ROK alliance 
eliminates the need for an alliance between Seoul and Tokyo.  A Japan-ROK alliance 
would be a formidable challenge to the PRC.  Beijing is not likely to respond favorably 
on the ROK-Japan alliance.  If the U.S.-ROK alliance is abrogated, Seoul faces an 
immediate security concern as to which nation to build an alliance with.  If history is of 
any guide, Korea has never formed an alliance with Japan.  Therefore, waning U.S. 
influence in the region does not serve South Korea’s strategic needs.  If Washington were 
to abandon Seoul as an ally, it remains to be seen if Seoul will show its utmost flexibility 
and form a Japan-ROK alliance.   
The justification of the USFK and the U.S.-ROK alliance is based on the North 
Korean threat.  The Korean reunification will “upset the tentative balance” in East Asia 
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and will have a “major impact” on the U.S. alliance system.235  Selig Harrison does not 
believe that the U.S. forces are needed in the Korean Peninsula to deter the DPRK 
aggression and to stabilize Northeast Asia; he believes that the DPRK’s dismal economy 
cannot support a DPRK’s aggression, and the U.S. military presence in the Korean 
Peninsula may instead increase regional tensions.236  The ROK in 1988 was nearly 
capable of defending themselves with the exception of air, naval, and strategic forces.237  
Hamm believes that advanced weapons and information technology rendered the ROK 
far more superior to the DPRK’s capability and that the USFK is a “surplus” defense 
asset.238     
While many U.S. analysts advocate for a post-reunification alliance between the 
United States, Japan, and the ROK, Selig Harrison argues for simultaneous termination of 
security treaties, if Beijing, Moscow, and Tokyo would formally pledge for non-
intervention in the Korean Peninsula. 239  In contrast to Harrison’s argument, whereas the 
EU nations have long been able to cooperate against the mutual threat of the USSR and 
perhaps developed a norm to trust each other in security matters, there has not been a 
broad and comprehensive cooperative behavior in East Asia.  Although there are more 
cultural similarities among Asian nations, each nation has its own distinctive culture, and 
nationalism is hardly a unifying factor.  The pledge for non-intervention has been 
violated in the past.   
The ROK cannot be a balancer between the United States and the PRC.240  Efraim 
Karsh, Robert Manning, and James Przystup believe that neutrality for buffer states does 
not work, and Jae Ho Chung believes that the ROK does not have an option to declare 
neutrality.241  The late nineteenth century showed that the major powers in the region 
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worried about the geopolitical location of the Korean Peninsula and intervened for the 
domination of Korea.  Neutrality was not an option for Korea.  Japan finally colonized 
Korea after its successful campaigns against the Qing and Russia in the early twentieth 
century.    
Even if the major powers pledge non-military intervention in the Korean 
Peninsula, the ROK is likely to maintain a strong military, whether in technology or 
manpower, to compensate for the absence of the USFK, unless its economy and 
unwillingness to pay for the military expenditure override its security threat perception.  
Hamm, however, recommends Seoul not to pursue an arms race against its more 
powerful neighbors because the ROK simply cannot match the PLA nor the Japanese 
Navy.242  Then, in terms of its cost and lethality, a nuclear option becomes appealing to 
the ROK.  The U.S.-ROK alliance, however, is the more preferable option.   
In the reunified Korea, nationalism will be stronger.  The syncretism of South 
Korean nationalism and North Korean Juche ideology may become problematic for the 
region.  In economic and military capacity, China and Japan are far stronger.  In the 
absence of the USFK, Seoul may have to reconsider the development of nuclear weapon 
for security and cost-cutting measure.  In terms of the economic cost, the Korean 
government does not pay much compensation to its draftees, but the ROK is losing 
valuable man-hours by drafting eligible young men out of work and education.  Since the 
DPRK possesses uranium mines, the reunified Korea is likely to depend more of its 
energy sources from the nuclear plants.   
A trilateral alliance between the United States, Japan, and the ROK is an option, 
but it would be met with resistance from anti-Japan sentiment in the ROK.  However, 
Seoul should consider Japan as a strategic ally because it can provide financial loans for 
the Korean reunification.243  And yet, Seoul is likely to continue to oppose the trilateral 
alliance since this would signal to Beijing that Seoul is siding with Washington in an 
effort to contain China.  Unlike Seoul, Tokyo is more willing to foster a stronger alliance 
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with Washington, and in March 2005, Tokyo and Washington showed solidarity as they 
declared the “peaceful resolution of issues concerning the Taiwan Strait.”244           
Another unlikely option for the ROK is to bandwagon with China and abrogate 
the U.S.-ROK alliance.  Because of the “brotherhood sealed in blood” between the PRC 
and the DPRK, it is unlikely that the ROK will fully bandwagon with Beijing.245  There 
are fundamental differences in the culture, identity, and government systems of South 
Koreans and Chinese.  Also, the ROK would lose more if the USFK departs the Korean 
Peninsula because of the high military expenditure to fill the gap left by the USFK.246  
Seoul would have to worry about foreign investors’ confidence if there were no longer 
the U.S. security umbrella.  The ROK policy toward the United States affects its national 
security and its economy.247  Seoul learned a bitter lesson when the foreign capital 
abruptly left South Korea during the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis.   
The PRC would behave in an imperial manner toward Seoul without the U.S.-
ROK alliance.  Seoul would lose its leverage against the DPRK.  As long as China stays 
as a communist state, bandwagoning with China is an unrealistic and infeasible option.  
There may be more conflict of interests than common goal.  It is premature for Seoul to 
bandwagon with China because China’s rise will take a minimum of 20 years.248  If the 
PRC becomes stronger than the United States, then the ROK has more reason to maintain 
the U.S.-ROK alliance to counterbalance the powerful, proximate power.      
Given the DPRK threat and the rise of China, the U.S.-ROK alliance may 
oscillate in strength and gradually be modified to reflect the different priorities of each 
nation.  The US-ROK Strategic Forum recommends Washington and Seoul to develop a 
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common approach toward Pyongyang and Beijing; both should employ “strategic 
patience” and ensure that the PRC will support “regional and global stability.”249   
Seoul, however, does not want to support the American efforts to counterbalance 
China because of the Sino-ROK trade and Beijing’s influence over Pyongyang.250  With 
Lee Myung-bak administration’s pro-U.S. policy and his focus on the Korean economy, 
Seoul will maintain or improve the current U.S.-ROK alliance and try to achieve the 
maximum benefits from doing business with the PRC and the United States.   
Seoul abandoned Taiwan and does not want to “offend China.”251  The Korean 
Peninsula, however, offers an excellent strategic position.  The DIA and NSA want to 
continue gathering information on China from the facilities in the ROK, and the USFK 
may prove useful in a conflict over Taiwan.252  If Washington and Beijing confront each 
other over Taiwan, Seoul will have to choose a side,253 or declare neutrality.  Seoul is 
reluctant to let the United States to use the Korean bases to fight a war against China.  
Beijing would try to shape anti-American sentiment in their advantage.   
If Seoul feels threatened by the PRC, one would expect a stronger U.S.-ROK 
alliance with an aim of balancing or containing the PRC.  In the event of reunification, 
the reunified Korea feeling threatened by the PRC could offer basing rights to the United 
States not too far from the Chinese border, or it could increase its capability through 
nuclear program.  If the ROK does not feel threatened by the PRC because of the U.S.-
ROK alliance, the ROK is likely to maintain the status quo and try to maximize the 
economic benefits from trade with the United States and the PRC.  Harmonious relation 
between Washington and Beijing is the best situation for Seoul.   
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Beijing believes that the USFK will continue to stay in the Korean Peninsula to 
“prevent the empowerment of China and Japan” and to “dominate the construction of a 
new order.”254  Beijing will not accept the Korean reunification with the current U.S.-
ROK alliance and the USFK north of the DMZ.255  In case of chaos after Kim Jong-il’s 
death, “there is a “100 percent possibility of the Chinese troops being stationed in North 
Korea.”256  The reunified Korea with 72 million people, a strong combined military, 
nuclear weapon, and the U.S.-ROK alliance would be unacceptable for the PRC.  
Another intrusion by the PLA will be met by a fierce anti-China sentiment by the 
majority of the Koreans.     
Although the PRC seems not to oppose the reunification, Beijing would be 
hesitant to share a border with a reunified Korea allied with the United States.  The major 
powers, especially the United States and the PRC, are reluctant to see the reunification of 
the Korean Peninsula because they are worried about the stability in the region.257  The 
foreign aid to the DPRK despite Pyongyang’s recalcitrant behavior attests to the major 
powers’ worry about stability.  Also, seeing the cost of the German reunification, Seoul is 
not eager to absorb the DPRK and wants to improve economic standards in the DPRK 
before the reunification.258  Nevertheless, if the living standards of the DPRK are 
improved, what would be a reason for Pyongyang to seek a reunification? 
There had been many complaints made by South Koreans regarding the U.S.-
ROK alliance.  What stands out is that each side feels left out of each other’s plan and 
intent.  Romberg believes that there were not enough prior consultations between Seoul 
and Washington regarding the southward relocation of the USFK, creating an “uneasy 
atmosphere.”259  On the issues of the Sino-American relations and the U.S.-ROK 
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alliance, Washington pursues its own strategy toward Beijing without telling Seoul 
although Seoul regards the PRC matters as vital to its interests.260  During the 1991 to 
1994 nuclear crisis, though Washington felt that it went through “extensive consultation” 
with Seoul, Seoul felt that it was “sidelined.”261   
South Koreans may argue that Washington often sidelined Seoul in its strategic 
decision that involved major implications to the Korean Peninsula.  The Nixon Shock and 
the 1994 Nuclear Crisis are examples.  From South Korean perspectives, Washington 
took over the 1994 nuclear crisis and reached the Agreed Framework without involving 
Seoul.262  Many South Koreans were shocked years later when they found out how close 
former President Clinton came to authorizing military operations against the DPRK.263  
Likewise, Seoul did not consult with Washington on a major event; Seoul notified the 
CIA just 36 hours before announcing the Inter-Korean Summit in 2000.264   
Technical and political consultation builds “confidence in members’ expectations 
of their allies’ behavior.”265  In order to improve the U.S.-ROK alliance, Washington and 
Seoul must utilize consultative processes such as the Trilateral Coordination and 
Oversight Group (TCOG), the Korea-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting (SCM), the 
Strategic Consultation for Allied Partnership (SCAP), and other necessary forums.  
Consultations should be informative as to one’s intent so that Seoul and Washington can 
prepare or readjust their priorities well ahead. 
The USFK Commander, General Burwell Bell stated that the U.S.-ROK alliance 
should not just focus on the DPRK threat, and he stressed a “multi-dimensional alliance 
whose members share the fundamental values of democratic principles, individual 
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freedom, and free market enterprise."266  While small agendas may differ, as long as 
Washington and Seoul share fundamental principles, the U.S.-ROK alliance will remain. 
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IV.   CONCLUSION 
It is inevitable that the PRC will continue to extend its influence over Korea.  The 
ROK recognizes that China as a land-based identity has historically tried to form its 
sphere of influence and intervened in the Korean affairs.  Despite the anti-American 
sentiment in the ROK, Seoul understands that there is a strong need for the U.S.-ROK 
alliance not only to deter the DPRK but also to ensure that its maritime power can 
counterbalance Chinese intrusion in the Korean affairs.   
Seoul’s foremost agendas are its sovereignty, economic prosperity, and peaceful 
reunification, and Seoul is likely to prefer to deal with foreign powers that are compatible 
with its agendas.  History illustrates that Korea has preferred to rely on an external power 
to counterbalance a proximate power, and it would be a tough situation for the ROK to 
withstand the weight of the PRC alone.  Seoul knows that the hectic diplomacy in the 
period of the waning Yi Dynasty did not produce a dependable ally or a patron.   
Koreans remember that when the Qing-Chosun tributary system was weakened, it 
was followed by the loss of the state due to the major powers’ interests in the Korean 
Peninsula.  Chosun lost its sovereignty when it simultaneously pursued the Qing-Chosun 
alliance, its “alignment with Japan,” and “liaising with America.”267  There is a difficulty 
in juggling major powers to one’s advantage.   
The formative years prior to the creation of the ROK are replete with injustices 
done to Koreans.  South Koreans will do what is necessary to maintain its hard-won 
independence and sovereignty.  As long as the United States remains pre-eminent in East 
Asia, the ROK will seek to rely on its maritime power against the continental power, 
even if domestic sentiment may be against the United States.  Seoul has a vested interest 
in ensuring the pre-eminence of the United States.  Seoul must understand that the 
Westphalian concept of equal standing exists, but it does not apply in East Asia where the 
ROK is a far smaller power than the PRC, Japan, Russia, and the United States.  Seoul 
needs to accept its physical limitations and act accordingly.   
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Korean security interests will dominate cultural and economic aspects.  Seoul 
must send an unambiguous signal to Washington that it continues to desire the U.S.-ROK 
alliance while maintaining its economic relationship with Beijing.   
Much of the blame for the failure of the DPRK lies with the failure of its regime, 
but if the external support of a patron is any measure, the United States did far better with 
the ROK than the PRC did with the DPRK.  When historically compared, the United 
States has been far more benign in its treatment of its ally and supported the ROK 
through military and economic assistance when the ROK needed it the most at the 
beginning of the republic.  The United States helped the ROK to become a strong and 
affluent nation.  This is significantly different from the Qing-Chosun tributary 
relationship in which the Qing extracted economic resources from the Chosun economy 
and enfeebled its power.  It would be interesting to see if the ROK can extract profits 
from trading with the PRC and the United States.  The fact that Washington shows little 
interest in normalization with the DPRK is one of the manifestations that Washington 
prefers dealing with Seoul.  It also helps the ROK as the legitimate government on the 
Korean Peninsula.    
Chosun existed from 1392 to 1910, longer than any other regimes in China and 
Japan.  The people of Chosun Yi Koreans were conservative and sought order in 
domestic and foreign affairs based on the Confucian ideas.  In fact, they took pride in 
preserving the tradition and rejecting changes.  If the identity of the Koreans has not 
changed, it is likely that South Koreans will find comfort in the existing U.S.-ROK 
alliance to preserve its interests.  If the Confucian identity has dwindled due to the 
Western influence and capitalism, South Koreans might display more flexibility in their 
affairs.  If the Western concept of balance of the power appeals to Koreans, then there are 
more reasons why the U.S.-ROK alliance will endure.   
Because the geopolitical location of Korea cannot be changed, and because the 
United States has been a good ally for over five decades, Seoul is likely to choose to 




PRC while maintaining a military and strategic alliance with the United States.  At any 
rate, Seoul prefers the current status quo and wants to avoid causing tensions between the 
United States and the PRC.     
Seoul has to convince the major powers that it is not worth fighting over Korea.  
Beijing and Washington should not be confrontational over the Korean issue.  Beijing 
must recognize that the presence of the U.S. forces is a historical and geopolitical 
necessity for Korea.  It is an opportunity that all sides could develop a cooperative 
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